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ABSTRACT 
Regarded as the most important international institution established since 
the United Nations, the International Criminal Court (ICC) was created to 
help end impunity. With its jurisdiction based on the principle of 
complementarity, it will only act when States are found unwilling or 
unable to investigate or prosecute perpetrators of serious international 
crimes. 
The provision that reflects the complementarity principle, article 17, 
stipulates the grounds for establishing whether a situation or a case is 
admissible before the Court. The said article defines the unwillingness and 
inability criteria, but had not provided any directive concerning instances 
where a State had remained inactive in relation to a crime that is under the 
jurisdiction of the ICC. Nevertheless, the Pre-Trial Chamber of the ICC 
held that a case in which a State had remained inactive is admissible. 
Satisfying the prerequisites of the unwillingness criteria, laid under article 
17, is a difficult task which the Prosecutor must bear. It requires 
examining the genuineness or the bona fide, or the lack thereof, of States 
in initiating proceedings. Inability, the other criteria of admissibility, 
appears to have provided clear conditions as when it can be said that a 
State is unable to carry out a genuine investigation or prosecution. Whilst 
helpful, inability's strict guidelines may restrain the admissibility of cases. 
Apart from the decision made by the Pre-Trial Chamber relating to cases 
of inaction, there is no admissibility determination applying article 17 
which the Court had made. There are, nevertheless, significant questions 
that can be raised, and which relate to how article 17 might be construed 
and applied in practice. The essence of this study is to explore those 
questions and speculate possible answers. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Article 17: Issues of Admissibility 
1. Having regard to paragraph 10 of the Preamble and article 1, the Court shall 
determine that a case is inadmissible where: 
(a) The case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has 
jurisdiction over it, unless that State is unwilling or unable genuinely to 
carry out the investigation or prosecution; 
(b) The case has been investigated by a State which has jurisdiction over it 
and the State has decided not to prosecute the person concerned, unless 
the decision resulted from the unwillingness or inability of the State 
genuinely to prosecute; 
(c) The person concerned has already been tried for conduct which is the 
subject of the complaint, and a trial by the Court is not permitted under 
_... article 20, paragraph 3; 
(d) The case is not of sufficient gravity to justify action by the Court. 
2. In order to determine unwillingness in a particular case, the Court shall 
consider, having regard to the principle of due process recognised by 
international law, whether one or more of the following exist, as applicable: 
(a) The proceedings were or are being undertaken or the national decision 
was made for the purpose of shielding the person concerned from criminal 
responsibility for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court referred to in 
article 5; 
(b) There has been an unjustified delay in the proceedings which in the 
circumstances is inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned 
to justice; 
(c) The proceedings were not or are not being conducted independently or 
impartially, and they were or are being conducted in a manner which, in 
1 
the circumstances, is inconsistent with an intent to bring the person 
concerned to justice. 
3. In order to determine inability in a particular case, the Court shall consider 
whether, due to a total or substantial collapse or unavailability of its national 
jurisdictional system, the State is unable to obtain the accused or the necessary 
evidence and testimony or otherwise unable to carry out its proceedings. ' 
Article 20: Ne Bis In Idem 
1. Except as provided in this Statute, no person shall be tried before the Court 
with respect to conduct which formed the basis of crimes for which the person 
has been convicted or acquitted by the Court. 
[. . .} 
3. No person who has been tried by another court for conduct also proscribed 
under article 6, 7 or 8 shall be tried by the Court with respect to the same 
conduct unless the proceedings in the other court: 
(a) Were for the purpose of shielding the person concernedfrom criminal 
responsibility for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court; or 
(b) Otherwise were not conducted independently or impartially in 
accordance with the norms of due process recognised by international 
law and were conducted in a manner which, in the circumstances, was 
inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice. ' 
2 
The present study intends to examine the admissibility of cases before the International 
Criminal Court (ICC or the Court hereafter). The issue of admissibility is mainly provided 
under article 1 7 and 20 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (the Rome 
Statute) and is governed by the principle of complementarity. The said principle maintains 
that the ICC is only to complement domestic courts and function as a last resort when national 
judicial systems are found unwilling or unable to investigate or prosecute genuinely. The 
study will seek to explore how the ICC, being the first tribunal of its kind, could interpret and 
apply the provisions of the said articles. It will speculate about the theoretical application of 
the relevant provision and look into other factors that may affect an admissibility 
determination. Finally, the study will attempt to answer questions whether a broad reading 
could be given to the terms of article 17 or strict adherence to the drafters' intent is most 
desirable. 
The importance of getting the right balance in interpreting admissibility must be underscored 
as it will determine the future of the ICC, that is, whether it becomes a significant institution 
in the international community. 1 On the one hand, an unreasonably rigid interpretation of 
article 17 might lead the Court's jurisdiction to become often dormant. On the other hand, a 
wider interpretation may entail serious repercussions; inter alia, it can be viewed as 
incompatible with the principle of complementarity to which the jurisdiction of the Court is 
based. The recognition of the relevance and implications of article 17, of how it might be 
applied in practice, makes an attempt to understand the same a worthy endeavour. 
The Rome Statute, regardless of how comprehensive it may seem, has inevitably unforeseen 
repercussions. Even before the Statute came into force, the lack of clear and comprehensible 
provisions on the issue of admissibility was already pointed out. Article 17, for example, did 
not elaborate on cases emanating from a State that has remained inactive or had voluntarily 
referred the matter to the ICC. In such instances when the Rome Statute has limited 
interpretative guidelines, the Court judges are left to construe and adjudicate on their own 
discretion. Pending precedence, it would be impossible to speculate with a certain degree of 
certainty, as to how the Court will determine the admissibility of a case where article 1 7 
1 See discussion in Summers, A Fresh Look At the Jurisdictional Provisions of the Statute of the International 
Criminal Court: The Case for Scrapping the Treaty [2001) 20 Wis. lnt'l Law Journal 57, at p. 75-6. 
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appears to be silent or even in cases where the said article appears to have provided adequate 
directive terms. Indeed, framing the limits of admissibility under a statute is one thing and 
putting it in practice is altogether, another matter. It is in the latter that issues will arise and 
which the Court will have to settle on a case-to-case basis. 
In this first chapter, the study commences with a brief history of the Court's establishment. It 
will be followed by a discussion of the principle of complementarity apropos to interpreting 
the Rome Statute, a concise account of the Court's jurisdiction and the role of the Prosecutor 
in relation to the admissibility of cases. The second chapter will focus on the legislative 
history that led to the present form of article 1 7. The third chapter will consider the said 
provision, section by section, and will examine possible situations or cases that are potentially 
admissible under the terms of the article. The fourth chapter will tackle article 20(1) and (3), 
and will exclude section (2) of that article as it concerns admissibility before national courts 
of cases that had already been decided by the ICC. The fifth chapter will provide a short 
discussion on Security Council referrals. Lastly, the final chapter will then contain the 
conclusion, highlighting important issues discussed in this study. 
A. Brief History of the Establishment of the International Criminal Court 
The Nuremberg trial raised the prospect of establishing a permanent international criminal 
tribunal that will be responsible for holding perpetrators of egregious international crimes 
individually liable.2 The United Nations (UN) subsequently took the initiative and embarked 
on what proved to be a long and complex endeavour. The UN General Assembly assigned the 
International Law Commission (!LC) to make a draft code of legal principles inherited from 
the Nuremberg trial.3 By 1953, two draft statutes transpired but which were never 
2 For further discussion on the Nuremberg trial see, inter alia: Summers, ibid., at p. 57, McGoldrick, 'Criminal 
Trials Before International Tribunal: Legality and Legitimacy' in The Permanent International Criminal Court 
by McGoldrick, Rowe, & Donnelly (Eds.) (Hart Publishing 2004), p. 14-20; and Stimson 'The Nuremberg Trial: 
Landmark in Law' [1947] 25 Foreign Affairs 179. 
3 General Assembly (GA) Resolution, UN General Assembly Official Records (GAOR), 2"d Session, UN Doc. 
N519 (1947). 
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implemented.4 The initiative was stalled partly due to lack of political will and partly because 
of the cold war era. 
Not until the establishment of the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunal of the former 
Yugoslavia (JCTY)5 and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)6 that 
significant progress towards establishing a permanent international criminal court took place. 
The work initiated more than 50 years ago, was then pursued with eminent momentum. The 
earlier drafts were revived and used as bases for drafting a new statute for a permanent court. 
Unlike the ad hoc tribunals which were created by the highly politicized Security Council, the 
proposed international court was to be established through a multilateral treaty in order to 
gather greater legitimacy than either the ICTY or ICTR.7 
Commissioned once again by the General Assembly to address the question of establishing an 
international criminal court, the ILC8 adopted a final draft statute in 1994, following a 
sustained consideration of the earlier drafts. 9 Although it served as an impetus to which the 
future Rome Statute was to be fashioned, the 1994 draft was criticised as having structural 
flaws. Among others, the ILC draft would create an international court where State consent, 
except for...genocide, is required to activate its jurisdiction. It was also noted that the 1994 
draft, if adopted, would create an international court that is closely linked to and, to a large 
extent, dependent upon the Security Council - an arrangement that was widely viewed to 
surely undermine the independence of an international criminal tribunal. 10 
4 Report of the Sixth Committee to the General Assembly, UN GAOR. 5th Session, UN Doc A/1639 (1950) and 
Report of the Committee on International Criminal Jurisdiction, UN GAOR, 7th Session, Supp. No. II, UN Doc. 
A/2136 (1952). 
5 Statute of the International Criminal Tribuna/for the Former Yugoslavia, Security Council (SC) Resolution 
827, SCOR, 48th Session, UN Doc. S/RES/827 (1993) [ICTY Statute hereafter]. 
6 Statute of the International Criminal Tribuna/for Rwanda, SC Resolution 955, SCOR, 49th Session, UN Doc. 
S/RES/955 (1994) [ICTR Statute]. 
7 See Brown, Primacy or Complementarity: Reconciling the Jurisdiction of National Courts and International 
Criminal Tribunals [I998] 23 Yale Int'l L. 383, at p. 386. 
8 GA Resolution 44/39, UN GAOR. 44th Session, Supp. No. 49, UN Doc. I A/44/39 (1989). 
9 Report of the International Law Commission, UN GAOR. 49th Session, Supp. No. I 0, UN Doc. A/49/I 0 
(1994). 
10 See Derby, An International Criminal Court for the Future [I995] 5 Transnational Law & Contemporary 
Problems 307, at 311 and Brown, op. cit. note 7, at p. 388. 
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Subsequently, the General Assembly established an ad hoc committee to further examine the 
1994 draft statute with a view to convene a diplomatic conference of plenipotentiaries for its 
possible adoption. 11 After considering the issues that transpired out of the ILC 1994 draft, the 
Ad Hoc Committee concluded that a diplomatic conference was yet too early. 12 As a result, 
the General Assembly decided to set up the Preparatory Committee, inviting UN member 
States, Non-Governmental Organisations (NGO) and other international organisations to take 
part in the Committee's proceedings. The PrepCom, as it was called, was mandated to 
'prepare a widely acceptable consolidated text of a convention for an international criminal 
court' using the 1994 draft and the work of the Ad Hoc Committee as its bases. 13 It was 
during the PrepCom sessions where the fundamental question of the court's jurisdiction, 
based on the principle of complementarity, was resolved. The resultant consensus enabled 
progress on other fundamental issues such as the exercise of jurisdiction and trigger 
mechanism, which are essentially intertwined. 14 
Pursuant to adopting a draft statute based on the Preparatory Committee's work, a diplomatic 
conference of plenipotentiaries (Rome Conference) was convened in Rome, Italy in 1998. 15 
As the question of complementarity was largely sorted out during the Preparatory Committee, 
the challenge for the diplomatic conference was to resist reopening negotiations on the said 
subject. The conference ended with the adoption of the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court. The Statute required ratification of at least 60 States before it enters into 
force. The sixtieth ratification was achieved in April 2002 in spite of the widespread 
expectation that it would take years or even a decade to reach the required minimum number 
of ratifications. The Rome Statute thus, entered into force on the 1st of July 2002 amidst 
hopeful enthusiasm. The Court is located in The Hague and, as of the time of writing, has yet 
to decide on its first case. It is regarded as the most important international institution 
established since the UN in 1945. 
11 GA Resolution, UN GAOR, 49th Session, UN Doc. N49/53 (1994). 
12 Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, UN GAOR, 501h 
Session, Supp. No. 22, UN Doc. N50/22 (1995). 
13 GA Resolution, UN GAOR, 50th Session, UN Doc. A/RES/50/46 (1995) 
14 See for further discussion Ohisolo, The Triggering Procedure of the International Criminal Court (Martinus 
NijhoffPublishers 2005), p. 147. 
15 GA Resolution, UN Doc N50/46 (1995), op. cit. 
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B. The Principle of Complementarity 
During the negotiation period, drafters were confronted with the fundamental question as to 
which judicial body shall prevail when an international court and domestic courts have 
concurrent jurisdiction over a particular crime. Two general options to which the question can 
be addressed16 were identified. The first option is the general primacy of an international 
court over national courts which provides that an international tribunal will have the prior 
right to prosecute crimes under its jurisdictional ambit. The jurisdiction of the ICTY and 
ICTR are based on this arrangement; both ad hoc tribunals have the power to stop a domestic 
court from prosecuting a case if they so discern that a particular case is for them to 
adjudicate. 17 The second option is based on the principle of complementarity which means, as 
the term suggests, that an international criminal court is only to function as a supplement to 
domestic courts when the latter fail to operate efficiently and in good faith. Phrased 
differently, it denotes that an international tribunal could only assume jurisdiction over cases 
or situations to which States have failed to investigate or prosecute genuinely because they are 
neither able nor willing. It was agreed that the jurisdiction of the ICC is based on this 
principle and as such, it acknowledges that national legal systems have the prior right or 
primacy to adjudicate. 
Complementarity provides that the jurisdiction of an international court remains dormant so 
long as national judicial systems function properly. Its activation will be contingent upon 
certain conditions, e.g. when the domestic court is not available or unwilling to adjudicate in 
faith good. During the ICC negotiation, the extent of those conditions upon which ICC's 
jurisdiction could be activated was heavily debated. There was a proposal that any proceeding 
taken by a State shall be enough ground to preclude the Court from intervening. 18 However, 
the ensuing view which prevailed was to go further than that. As tyrants in the past proved 
capable of abusing their powers in order to escape their culpabilities, the idea was to include 
sham proceedings as one of the conditions that could activate the Court's jurisdiction. Hence, 
16 See Brown, op. cit note 7. 
17 Article 9 of the ICTY Statute and Article 8 ofthe ICTR Statute. 
18 See discussion in Preparatory Committee on Establishment of International Criminal Court, I & 2 April 1996, 
1st Session, 11th & 13th Meetings, available at CICC website: <www.iccnow.org> (visited last 14 Janumy 2007); 
and Holmes, 'The Principle of Complementarity', in Lee (ed.), The International Criminal Court: The Making of 
the Rome Statute, Issues, Negotiation, Results (Kluwer Law International, 1999), at p. 47-53. 
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the ICC has jurisdiction not only when national legal systems are found unable but also when 
they are proven unwilling to carry out bona fide proceedings. 
It was perhaps inevitable that the jurisdiction of the ICC is based on complementarity. 19 First, 
primacy over domestic courts could exceedingly impinge upon State sovereignty. However an 
international court based on complementarity should not altogether be viewed as no longer 
posing a threat to sovereignty. The difference is that in having a primacy of jurisdiction, 
States are given the first opportunity to investigate or prosecute; where national courts are 
able to perform their tasks in good faith, an international criminal court is barred from 
intervening. In the drafters' view, it also seemed unlikely, if not impossible, that many States 
will sign and ratify a treaty that confers primacy on an international tribunal. In the case of the 
ICTY and ICTR, their primacy ensued because of the expedient method in which they were 
created. A Security Council resolution, which is binding on all UN member States, 
established these ad hoc tribunals. The jurisdiction of the ad hoc courts were temporally and 
territorially restraint, having fewer States affected within a limited time-frame. Owing to the 
envisaged international character of the Court and its unlimited temporal reach, it was deemed 
inappropriate and conceivably politically impossible for the Security Council to set up a 
permanent international court via a binding resolution?0 Second, given that many States 
already have the international obligation to prosecute certain international crimes, such as 
Genocide,21 if a permanent international court has primacy, it is possible that States could end 
up in a dilemma: whether to defer prosecution and risk breaching international duties or 
uphold their international obligations and blatantly disregard the primacy of such an 
international court. This conflict can be minimised considerably if States are to retain their 
prior right to investigate or prosecute, with the international court intervening only to 
complement domestic judicial systems when they fail to prosecute serious international 
crimes. 
19 See Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, UN GAOR, 
50th Session, Supp. No. 22, UN Doc N50/22 ( 1995), at para. 36 where the principle of complementarity was 
described as 'an essential element in the establishment of an international criminal court'. 
20 See discussion in Brown, op. cit. note 7, p. 386-7. 
21 Article l & 4-6 ofthe 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment ofthe Crime of Genocide. 
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C. Interpreting the Rome Statute 
As an international treaty, interpreting the Rome Statute is subject to articles 31 and 3 2 of the 
Vienna Convention on the Laws of Treaties of 1969. Article 31 stipulates that a treaty is to be 
read 'in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the 
treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.' The context referred to 
includes the preamble and any agreement and instrument which were adopted in connection 
to the conclusion of the treaty. In instances where an interpretation, in accordance with article 
31, leaves the meaning ambiguous, unreasonable or manifestly absurd, article 32 provides that 
the drafting history or the travaux preparatoires may be resorted to; however, it must be 
emphasised that article 32 is subordinate to article 31. 
In relation to admissibility of cases, the Rome Statute, in light of the principle of 
complementarity, should always decide in favour of national proceedings. Article 1 of the 
Rome Statute maintains that the ICC is only complementary to domestic courts when the 
latter is unable or unwilling to carry a genuine proceeding. Thus, if a domestic authority 
initiates an investigation, the ICC prima facie has no jurisdiction to intervene. 
D. The Jurisdiction of the ICC 
Jurisdiction and admissibility are two distinct concepts. The former refers to the legal 
parameters in which a court can exercise its judicial powers. These include the subject matter 
or ratione materie, territorial jurisdiction or ratione loci, temporal jurisdiction or ratione 
temporis, and personal jurisdiction or ratione personae. Any criminal court, including the 
ICC, must first establish that a situation or a case is within its jurisdictional ambit before it 
can issue an authorisation to investigate or before it can prosecute. Admissibility, nonetheless, 
arises normally at the subsequent stage once the court is already satisfied that it has 
jurisdiction to commence proceedings. It involves some kind of discretion on the part of the 
Court, assessing whether a situation or a case can or should be admitted. 
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The two concepts, however, are not often easy to distinguish. In relation to the ICC which is 
founded on the complementarity principle, it is submitted that the above distinction is not as 
significant in comparison to a domestic criminal justice system. For example, in a case of 
genocide where a national court appropriately dealt with the matter and in good faith, the 
jurisdiction of the Court would have to remain dormant. This is so, despite the fact that 
genocide is one of the crimes under the ICC jurisdiction. Such a case will not only be 
inadmissible because of the action already taken domestically but, by virtue of the Rome 
Statute preamble and article 17, the Court's jurisdiction shall have to be put on hold. To this 
extent therefore, it is possible to posit that issues of admissibility in relation to article 17 co-
defines the Court's jurisdiction.22 Nevertheless, the distinction between jurisdiction and 
admissibility is of relevance when the ground used to challenge admissibility is that a case is 
'not of serious gravity to justify further action by the Court. ' 23 Under such circumstances, 
jurisdiction must first be established before any challenge concerning the gravity of a case 
will arise. 
Article 5 of the Rome Statute lists the ratione materie, that is, the crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the ICC. These violations, regarded as 'the most serious crimes of international 
concern, '
24 include the following: genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and 
aggression. Aggression, however, is subject to further agreement during a future review 
process and the subsequent adoption of a provision that will define the conditions under 
which the ICC may exercise its jurisdiction.25 The Court, furthermore, has jurisdiction over 
'offences against administration of justice,' which involve petjury, interfering or tampering of 
evidence, and bribing officials, among others. 26 
The ICC is not retroactive and as such, it will not have any jurisdiction over crimes 
committed prior to its establishment.27 If a State became a party subsequent to the Rome 
Statute's creation, the ICC could only exercise its jurisdiction over crimes committed after the 
22 See Summers, op. cit. note I, at p. 66-7. 
23 Article 17(1 )(d) of the Rome Statute. 
24 Article l, ibid. 
25 Article 5(2), ibid. 
26 Article 70, ibid. and Rules 162-9 and 172, ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence. 
27 Article ll (l ), ibid. 
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Statute came into force with respect to that State?8 Concerning ICC's territorial jurisdiction, 
article 12(2)(a) provides that the Court has jurisdiction over events that took place in the 
territory of any State party, regardless of the perpetrator's nationality. The ICC may also 
assume jurisdiction over crimes committed in the territory of States that accepted Court's 
jurisdiction on an ad hoc basis29 or in the territory of non-States Parties where the Security 
Council acting under Chapter VII so authorizes. As regards to personal jurisdiction, the Court 
may exercise its authority over nationals of State parties and non-State parties that accepted 
ICC's jurisdiction and likewise, where the Security Council designates the same.30 
E. The Role of the Prosecutor vis-d-vis Admissibility 
A better appreciation of the practical application of article 1 7 requires a brief examination of 
the role of the Prosecutor. The Prosecutor is authorised to initially determine which case may 
be brought before the Court. Since victims cannot formally instigate an ICC proceeding, the 
role of the Prosecutor assumes greater significance31 -particularly, in light of the prevailing 
State practice where governments are disinclined to accuse or complaint against other 
governments and the Security Council, for its part, to refer a situation to the ICC has to 
overcome a political burden. 
Under article 15 of the Rome Statute, the Prosecutor may initiate an investigation propio motu 
on the basis of information made available to him or her by the UN, intergovernmental or 
non-governmental organisations or by victims or if already deceased, their families. Upon 
receiving such information, the Prosecutor is to determine whether the reported situation is 
within the jurisdiction, if it appears admissible before the ICC and whether the data collected 
form a reasonable basis to initiate an ICC investigation.32 When the Prosecutor concludes 
there is a sufficient ground, he or she is required to seek an authorisation from the Pre-Trial 
28 Article 11(2), ibid For further discussion see Schabas, Introduction to the International Criminal Court 
(Cambridge University Press 2000), at p. 56-9. 
29 Article 12(3), ibid 
30 Article 12(2)(b), ibid 
31 See Cassese, Is the ICC Still Having Teething Problems? [2006] 4 JICJ 434, at p. 435. 
32 Article 53(1), op. cit. 
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Chamber to proceed with an investigation. 33 Only when the Pre-Trial Chamber authorises an 
investigation will the Prosecutor be able to further pursue the matter. 
Exemptions to the requisite authorisation from the Pre-trial Chamber to initiate an 
investigation are referrals directly emanating from a State Party or the Security Council. It is 
not clear, however, whether the Prosecutor, in such instances, is obliged to initiate aformal 
investigation. 34 Nevertheless, in deciding whether to commence an investigation, the 
Prosecutor is compelled to determine the following: if the information provided forms a 
reasonable basis that a crime within the Court's jurisdiction had been committed; if 'the case 
would be admissible under article 17'; and whether it is in the interest of justice. 35 
When the Prosecutor decides to initiate an investigation proprio motu, following an 
authorization from the Pre-Trial Chamber or State referral, he or she is mandated to notify all 
State Parties who 'would normally exercise jurisdiction over the crimes concerned. ' 36 This 
allows the manifestation of the complementary relationship of the Court and domestic 
jurisdiction. The interested State or States are given a month to 'inform the Court that it is 
investigating or has investigated' the crime in question and to request the Prosecutor to defer 
to the domestic proceeding. 37 The Prosecutor ought to defer to national jurisdiction, unless he 
or she is able to obtain an authorization from the Pre-Trial Chamber on the basis that the State 
concerned had remained inactive, that the domestic proceeding being carried out is, in truth, 
intended to shield a perpetrator from his or her criminal responsibility, or that the State is 
unable to undertake a genuine proceeding. Both the Prosecutor and the interested State may 
appeal the decision of the Pre-Trial Chamber to the Appeals Chamber. 
Another role of the Prosecutor relates to the onus of proof in establishing that a domestic 
judicial body is unwilling or unable to carry out a genuine proceeding. Although the Rome 
Statute is silent as to who, in particular, shall carry the burden in proving whether a case is 
admissible or not, it is submitted that it is for the Prosecutor to bear - at the very least, during 
33 Article 15(3), ibid 
34 Schabas, op. cit. note 28, p.lOO. 
35 Article 53(1), op. cit. 
36 Article 18( 1 ), ibid. 
37 Article 18(2), ibid 
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the initial stages of proving admissibility.38 It can be argued that the criminal law principle 
onus probandi actori incumbit, i.e. 'he who alleges must prove', which is common to most 
domestic criminal justice systems, would attest to this. On the contrary, it was proposed 
during the PrepCom to cast such burden upon States which should be in a better position to 
provide information of whether the domestic proceeding in question was genuine. 39 The 
proposal did not prevail during the deliberations but it is a possibility that the merits of this 
argument might eventually be taken up by the Court- particularly, where valuable evidence 
pertaining to the genuineness of a proceeding is exclusively accessible to national authority. 
Nevertheless, it seems more logical to conclude that, in general, the onus of proving the 
admissibility of a case falls upon the Prosecutor. 
Under article 19, the Court, on its own motion, may determine that a case before it is not 
admissible. The article also provides as to who may challenge the Court's jurisdiction or the 
admissibility of a case: 'an accused or a person for whom a warrant of arrest or a summons to 
appear has been issued'; a State party that has jurisdiction over the case concerned; and a 
State who accepted the jurisdiction of the ICC under article 12. Those with locus standi as 
regards to challenging admissibility or jurisdiction may present their opposition to the Pre-
trial Chamber only once before the trial commences or under exceptional circumstances, 
subject to a leave and only on the ground based on article 17(1Xc), during the commencement 
of the trial. 
38 Where the Rome Statute is silent, the Court will have to develop jurisprudence through case law. See 
discussion in The Office of the Prosecutor, Informal Expert Paper: the Principle of Complementarity in Practice 
[2003] at p. 16-18, available at <http://www. icc-cpi.int/library/organs/otp/complementaritv.pdt> (last visited 10 
January 2006) [Informal Expert Paper hereafter]. 
39 See authority on international law: B/eiser v Uruguay, Communication No. R 7/30 (23 May 1978), UN Doc. 
Supp. No. 40 (A/37/40) at p. 130: 'With regard to burden of proof, this cannot rest alone on the author of the 
communication, especially considering that the author and the State party do not always have equal access to the 
evidence and that frequently the State party alone has the access to relevant information.' 
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II. ARTICLE 17 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
Upon drafting a statute for an international criminal court, the ILC envisaged a court that is to 
supplement, as opposed to supplant, domestic legal systems. From the ILC 1994 draft statute, 
it had been apparent that the Court's jurisdiction will be based on complementarity. However, 
due to the draft's inadequate elaboration of complementarity, its precise nature and 
parameters have yet to be settled. In the preamble of the draft statute, it was emphasised that 
the Court is only intended to intervene when national legal proceedings are unavailable or 
ineffective. 40 Article 35 of the 1994 draft, entitled 'Issues of Admissibility' and which served 
as the embryo of article 17 of the Rome Statute, made reference to this preamble but failed to 
establish sufficient and effective criteria as to when the international criminal court can 
assume jurisdiction.41 For example, while article 35(b) provided that a case is inadmissible if 
it is under investigation by a national court, the said article lacked clear guidelines in 
ascertaining an 'ineffective' investigation or a 'sham' proceeding. Moreover, it was 
concluded during the PrepCom that amendments to the draft statute were in order - to extend 
the jurisdiction of the Court to cases which had been or are being prosecuted rather than 
limiting the same to situations that have been investigated or are being investigated. 
Under the ILC draft, the Court may intervene with respect to a crime when the domestic 
judicial body concerned is unable to proceed. The draft, nevertheless, did not provide for 
specific criteria pertaining to this ground; it was presumed that a national legal system's 
inability to function is essentially self-evident. Whilst the concept of inability as a basis for 
the Court to assume jurisdiction was generally accepted, there was a clamour during the 
PrepCom that the statute should explicitly contain a criteria defining inability. Those who 
advocated for further clarification of the term 'inability' felt that in failing to do so, the statute 
40 Report of the International Law Commission on the Work oflts Forty-Sixth Session, UN GAOR, 49th Session, 
UN Doc A/49/355. 
41 Article 35 of the ILC draft: 'The Court may, on application by the accused or at the request of an interested 
State at any time prior to the commencement of the trial, or of its own motion, decide, having regard to the 
purposes or this statute set out in the preamble, that a case before it is inadmissible on the ground that the crim in 
question: (a) has been duly investigated by a State with jurisdiction over it, and the decision of that State not to 
proceed to a prosecution is apparently well-founded; (b) is under investigation by a State which has or may have 
jurisdiction over it, and there is no reason for the Court to take any further action for the time being with respect 
to the crime; or (c) is not of such gravity to justify action by the Court.' 
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will confer wide discretion upon the Court. Consequently, the Preparatory Committee heeded 
this proposal and developed the criteria delineating inability. 
First, it was established that in determining inability, any of the following facts have been 
identified: the State in question is unable to obtain the necessary evidence, arrest the suspect 
or otherwise unable to carry out the appropriate legal proceedings. The latter qualifier, 
'otherwise unable to carry out its proceedings', whilst regarded by some delegations as 
'superfluous,'42 was included in response to the argument that there are factors, other than 
inability to gather the requisite evidence and gain custody of the suspect, which may impede a 
State from executing a legal action. 
Second, it was agreed that the above identified criteria - inability to acquire the necessary 
evidence and arrest the suspect or the inability to carry out legal proceedings~ must have 
been a result of 'total or partial collapse or unavailability' of a State legal system. In spite of 
the PrepCom' s approval, some State delegations during the Rome Conference expressed their 
concern over the term 'partial collapse.' They argued that a partial collapse in a domestic 
judicial system does not necessarily imply that the State concerned is no longer capable of 
carrying out bona fide proceedings. As a ground justifying intervention, they further cited that 
partial collapse might trigger ICC jurisdiction in circumstances where only an obscure district 
of a particular country is affected by an outbreak but that the judicial system in the other 
regions of that State continue to operate normally. Several proposals were put forward to 
address this concern. It was suggested that the adjective 'partial' should be dropped and 'total 
collapse' be retained. Another proposal urged the use of the term 'substantial' instead of 
'partial.' The latter proposal elicited a consensus from among the delegations. Whilst, to a 
lesser extent, it was acknowledged that the word can also be subjected to the same criticism 
put forth against 'partial', the adjective 'substantial' was acceptable to most of the state 
delegations because this qualification raised the threshold to a higher, relatively more precise, 
level. 
The inclusion of the term 'ineffective' in the preamble of the 1994 draft established that the 
ILC intended the jurisdiction of the Court to go beyond situations where national forums are 
42 Holmes, 'The Principle of Complementarity,' op. cit note 18, at p. 49. 
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not available or are simply unable to function. In pursuing this matter during the PrepCom, 
the criterion 'unwillingness' was developed, in reference to sham proceedings in domestic 
legal systems which may be performed for the purpose of shielding perpetrators from criminal 
convictions. Once proven, it is only at this juncture that the Court can step in and intervene. In 
other words, the Court will be able to exercise jurisdiction over cases where domestic 
proceedings have been found to include fraudulent measures geared at impunity. 
However, on one hand, whilst consensus was arrived at, without much difficulty, insofar as 
inability was concerned, on the other hand, the notion of 'unwillingness' as another 
prerequisite to activate the Court's dormant jurisdiction, was strongly objected to, by several 
State delegates. Those who opposed its inclusion reasoned that, if such an authority is 
conferred upon the ICC, the Court could impinge upon State sovereignty. It was also pointed 
out that unwillingness appears incompatible to the criminal law principle of ne bis in idem or 
the right not to be prosecuted twice for the same offence, which is often guaranteed 
constitutionally. Although those objections were not without validity, they were outweighed 
by the assertion that if unwillingness is not included 'it would be almost a signal to States that 
they could easily prevent the ICC from taking jurisdiction by initiating an investigation or 
prosecution', regardless of whether such domestic proceedings are bona fide. 43 Furthermore, 
Justice Louise Arbour argued that 'if unfounded charges are laid, the accused will be 
acquitted. But if persons guilty of crimes within the Statute are out of reach of the Prosecutor, 
the very purpose of the Statute will be defeated. ' 44 As deliberations in the PrepCom continued 
concerning the unwillingness criterion, more delegations became open to the idea and 
concessions from both sides of the argument began to emerge. 
In defining unwillingness, several State delegations expressed concern that the ICC might in 
tum pass judgments on how domestic legal systems should function. In line with this 
argument, they insisted that unwillingness as a criterion has to be unequivocally objective; 
accordingly, qualifiers which seemed to be subjectively inclined were ruled out. Illustrative of 
this move was the replacement of the word 'effectively' with the term 'genuinely,' owing to 
43 Williams, 'Article 17 Issues of Admissibility' in Triffierer (ed.), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court: Observers' Notes, Article by Article (Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft Baden-Baden 
1999), p. 388. 
44 Justice Arbour during the PrepCom session, 8 December 1997. 
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'a judgmental aspect' which the former adjective accords to the Court. The State delegations 
argued that their criminal justice system might be judged against a 'perfectionist' standard. 
States were concerned that the Court might admit a case on the basis that another method of 
pursuing accountability is more effective than the one taken by domestic authorities, 
notwithstanding States' bona fide intentions. The latter term was considered 'the least 
objectionable word', albeit some delegates still believed 'effectively' is clearer than 
'genuinely' .45 
As the purpose of establishing the unwillingness criteria was to cover cases where domestic 
proceedings were, in truth, for the purpose of protecting perpetrators from criminal 
convictions, sham proceedings was immediately included as a condition that defines 
unwillingness. Even during the deliberations, the difficulty in proving that a domestic 
proceeding is fraudulent in character was already foreseen. Consequently, further conditions 
were put in place in order to ease this burden. One of the two additional conditions, the 
PrepCom agreed is 'undue delays' that is 'inconsistent' with an intention of undertaking a 
bona fide investigation or prosecution. The other condition involved the lack of independence 
and impartiality on the part of the national criminal systems. The agreed-upon text reads that a 
case is admissible before the ICC if proven that the relevant proceedings carried out by the 
State concerned, lacked independence or impartiality. This condition covers possible 
situations were the threshold to establish sham proceedings cannot be satisfied yet good faith 
in carrying out the procedure seems difficult to ascertain. The possibility was also raised that 
in actual practice, a State may have been investigating or prosecuting in good faith; however, 
in the course of the legal action, powerful and influential individuals might tamper with the 
legal system to ensure the acquittal of those who are criminally responsible. 
Subsequently, during the Rome Conference, the criterion, 'undue delays' was modified. The 
term 'undue' was unacceptable to many State delegates who argued that it would provide a 
very low threshold for unwillingness. The adjective 'undue' was then replaced with 
'unjustified', which was believed to have raised the threshold higher. The preference for 
'unjustified' was in light of the fact that it entails a chance for States to give their reason for 
the delay; an opportunity which is not available, if the word 'undue' was employed. 
45 Holmes, 'The Principle of Complementarity,' op. cit. note 18, at p. 50. 
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As exemplified above, the PrepCom believed that the ILC draft has to be expanded to include 
cases that had been or were being prosecuted. Along this line, 'cases being prosecuted', were 
incorporated to subsume instances where the State concerned is unwilling or unable to 
genuinely investigate or prosecute. However, for cases that had already been previously 
prosecuted by a domestic court called for a different set of provisions. For a start, to allow the 
Court to hear a case that had already been prosecuted was viewed as incompatible to the ne 
bis in idem principle or the rule against double jeopardy. This principle had been provided in 
another article in the 1994 draft, article 42, under the heading ne bis in idem and which can 
now be found in article 20 of the Rome Statute. Article 42, nevertheless, stipulated two 
exemptions to the principle: one, where the domestic prosecution was not conducted 
impartially or independently and two, where it was for the purpose of shielding the accused 
from his or her international criminal culpability. During the PrepCom, the committee 
decided to articulate under the admissibility article that a case which had already been 
prosecuted by a domestic court is inadmissible; the exemption under the article on ne bis in 
idem was rewritten and ended up reflecting the wording of the unwillingness criteria. The 
article on ne bis in idem then provides that a case already heard by a national court is 
inadmissible unless: (a) it was for the purpose of shielding the person concerned from 
criminal responsibility, or (b) the proceeding was not conducted independently or impartially, 
rendering the action(s) taken to be inconsistent with an intent to undertake a bona fide 
proceeding. 
Article 1 7, which dealt with issues of admissibility after the renumbering of articles during 
the Rome conference, was described as the 'cornerstone' of the Rome Statute.46 It manifests 
the complementary nature of the relationship between the ICC and domestic courts, 
particularly, as to when the ICC could admit a case or defer to national jurisdiction. In 
reference to admissibility, it must also be noted that article 20 of the Rome Statute, which 
stipulates the principle ne bis in idem, is highly relevant. Article 20 was referred to in article 
17(1)(c) and has a provision rendering prosecuted cases to be admissible, that is, after certain 
prerequisites have been met. 
46 Williams, op. cit., at p. 384, para I. 
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Before moving on to the next section, it must be pointed out that the distinction between 
'situations' and 'cases' was not reflected in article 17. The former concept refers to the pre-
investigation period at the domestic or international level whilst the latter is when the ICC 
Prosecutor had already initiated a formal investigation.47 It is submitted- notwithstanding the 
language contained in the said article which only refers to 'cases'48 - that article 17 is 
applicable to both.49 Hence, the Prosecutor, upon receiving a referral from a State or the 
Security Council, is not actually in receipt of a 'case', but rather a 'situation' in which a 
decision of admissibility has to be undertaken for a possible case worthy of an ICC 
investigation. Furthermore, Article 17 did not make any reference to article 53 of the Rome 
Statute, under the heading, 'Initiation of an Investigation,' which to a certain extent, should be 
read in conjunction with the former article. Article 53 commends the Prosecutor to make a 
preliminary determination whether a situation referred to him or her has reasonable basis to 
justify an investigation and, inter alia, appears admissible under the terms of article 17. In 
light of Article 53, when a situation is referred, the Prosecutor is tasked to apply the 
provisions of article 17 in order to determine whether, indeed, there is a reasonable basis to 
proceed. 5° 
The failure of the drafters to incorporate the distinction between 'cases' and 'situations' can 
be drawn from the fact that article 17 was mainly resolved during the PrepCom sessions 
whilst their distinction was finalised during the Rome Conference. It is either lack of time or 
the strong resistance to reopen the negotiation on complementarity that hindered the drafters 
to reflect in printed form, the applicability of article 17 not only to 'cases' but likewise to 
'situations' .51 
47 For discussion as regards the distinction between the notion of 'situation' and 'case,' see Olasolo, Reflections 
on the International Criminal Court's Jurisdictional Reach [2005] 16 Crim. L. Forum 279, at p.28 I -5. 
48 See Philips, The International Criminal Court Statute: Jurisdiction and Admissibility [1999] 10 Crim. Law 
Forum 61, at p. 77-8. 
490hisolo, op. cit. note 14, p. 147-8. 
50 See Informal Expert Paper, op. cit. note 38, at p. 9. 
51 See ibid 
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III. ARTICLE 17 OF THE ROME STATUTE 
Under article 17 of the Rome Statute, there are three instances where a case or a situation is 
potentially admissible before the ICC: (i) inaction - where the State concerned remained 
inactive in relation to a situation that appears to be within the jurisdiction of the Court; (ii) 
unwillingness- where an investigation or prosecution was a result of a State's unwillingness 
to investigate or prosecute genuinely; and (iii) inability - where a State is found to be unable 
to carry out genuine investigation or prosecution. The admissibility of a case could also be 
subjected to article 16 of the Rome Statute which confers power to the Security Council to 
bring to a halt any investigation or prosecution of a situation or case which the ICC is 
undertaking through the adoption of a resolution to that effect. Under the said article, such a 
resolution will have a validity of one year but the same can be extended ad irifinitum through 
a similar means, if the Council so decides. 
The ICC determines whether a situation or a case is admissible based on the genuineness of a 
proceeding. The term 'genuinely' is the key qualifier that divides cases or situations which are 
potentially admissible from those which are not. A case may be admissible to the ICC 
because an investigation or a decision not to prosecute in the national court was due to 
inability or unwillingness of the State concerned. Likewise, a domestic case being prosecuted 
is admissible when the State conducting such a prosecution was proven to be unable or 
unwilling. In both instances, the adjective 'genuinely' sets the objective standard for 
admissibility. As earlier recalled, the previous term 'effective' was rejected during the 
negotiation because the word 'genuine' proved more acceptable to many. It was agreed that 
the term 'genuine' makes the threshold higher than referring to a domestic proceeding as 
'effective.' Furthermore, insofar as the Statute is concerned, the meaning of genuine 
proceeding must be construed in light of the 'principles of due process recognised under 
international law. ' 52 
52 Article 17. Discussions on unwillingness and inability, below, would provide further understanding as to what 
is meant by a proceeding that is not genuine, p. 50-76. 
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A. Article 17(1) 
Article 17 assumes inadmissibility of cases which are being addressed by States that have 
jurisdiction. Paragraph 1 of the said article provides that a case or a situation is inadmissible: 
(i) if it is being investigated; (ii) if it had been investigated and the State concerned decided 
not to proceed; (iii) if the case was already prosecuted; or (iv) where it is not of sufficient 
gravity to justify an ICC proceeding. Save for the last condition, the other criteria are subject 
to exceptions. Even though a case is being investigated or had been investigated or prosecuted 
it may still be admitted to the Court provided it can be established that the domestic procedure 
taken were out of unwillingness to investigate or prosecute genuinely or that the State is 
simply unable to carry out the investigation due to a total or substantial collapse of its legal 
system. If a State, nonetheless, remained inactive in relation to a situation where serious 
international crimes under the jurisdiction of the ICC had been committed, such a situation 
will be admissible under the terms of article 17(1 ). 
1. Inaction 
Article 17 gives effect to the complementarity regime of the ICC. Accordingly, there are two 
ways of interpreting the principle of complementarity.53 On the one hand, there is the 
'negative' interpretation of the complementarity principle. It entails that the Court's 
jurisdiction is limited to cases where a State is proven unwilling or unable for the purposes of 
the Rome Statute to genuinely carry out a proceeding. 54 With this interpretation, the Court has 
to be satisfied that a State is either unwilling or unable in any situation or case, including 
where a State had remained inactive. Thus, if article 17's unwillingness or inability criteria 
cannot be satisfied, the Court must then render a situation or case, even in the absence of 
domestic proceeding, inadmissible. On the other hand, the 'positive' interpretation of the 
complementarity principle asserts that article 17(2) and article 17(3), which spell out the 
unwillingness and inability conditions, become only relevant when a State had exercised its 
53 See Akhavan, The Lord's Resistance Army Case: Uganda's Submission of the First State Referral to the 
International Criminal Court [2005] 99 Amer. J. Int'l. L. 403, at p. 413. 
54 Ibid. 
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jurisdiction. A situation or case will be admissible in the absence of any domestic 
investigation or prosecution. The unwillingness or inability criteria will only be engaged if a 
State had initiated a proceeding in order to determine whether the ICC has the authority to 
supersede a State's endeavour to investigate or prosecute. 55 
The question as to which interpretation will be used is important in cases of inaction ~ that is, 
where no State had initiated an investigation with regards to a situation involving an alleged 
crime or crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC. The language of article 17 does not 
mention 'inaction' nor spell out in positive terms whether those cases where no jurisdiction 
was exercised are presumed admissible. 56 In the negDtiatiDn period, it appears as well that the 
framers of the Rome Statute assumed that States would be averse to ICC intervention and had 
not carefully contemplated the possibility of a State's voluntarily invitation to the Court to 
exercise its jurisdiction, nor a State's indifference and decision against taking any legal 
action, after having been notified of the Prosecutor's intention to investigate, 57 under article 
18. If a negative interpretation of the principle of complementarity is considered, the 
admissibility under inaction would require that article 17(2) or (3), the unwillingness and 
inability criteria, is first satisfied before a case of inaction could be admitted. That could pose 
a problem because under the stipulated criteria, the preconditions defining unwillingness and 
inability refer to 'proceedings,' which would not be relevant if a State had not, in the first 
place, initiated any domestic action. 
If inaction is to be admissible before the Court, the positive interpretation has to be adopted. 
Accordingly, legal experts who were gathered upon the request of the Court to study the 
principle of complementarity in practice, concluded: 'where nD State has initiated any 
investigation [ ... ] the case is simply admissible under the clear terms of article 17.'58 In the 
Informal Expert Paper they produced, it was reasoned that none of the barrierS of 
admissibility under article 17(l)(a) to (c) are satisfied. In other words, as article 17(1) 
55 Ibid 
56 See Arsanjani &Reisman, The Law-In-Action of the International Criminal Court [2005] 99 Amer. J. Int'l. L. 
285, at p. 392: 'such [Ugandan voluntary] referral does not seem to meet the requirement of admissibility under 
article 17 of the Statute.' 
57 See the Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, UN GAOR, 
50th Sess., Supp. No. 22, para. 47, UN Doc. A/50/22 (1995); and discussion in Arsanjani &Reisman, ibid, at p. 
386-7. 
58 ICC, Office of the Prosecutor, Informal Expert Paper, op. cit. note 38, para 18. 
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enumerated those cases that are inadmissible and that inaction was not identified as one, it can 
therefore be assumed that cases of inaction are automatically admissible. 59 
More significantly, jurisprudence may be cited to shed light on this matter. In a decision by 
the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber, in the case of the Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, 60 the 
Chamber adopted a positive interpretation. It was concluded therein that where no jurisdiction 
can be regarded to have initiated a proceeding in relation to a serious international crime and 
the perpetrator involved, such a situation or case is admissible before the ICC.61 In deciding 
the admissibility of the case in question, the Pre-Trial Chamber held that 'in the absence of 
any acting State, the Chamber need not make any analysis of unwillingness or inability. ' 62 
The authority of this decision, confirming that it is to be applied in future decisions, is 
entrenched under article 21 (2) of the Rome Statute: 'the Court may apply principles and rules 
of laws as interpreted in its previous decisions.' 
Furthermore, on practical and heuristic grounds, further compelling arguments can be cited in 
support of the admissibility of cases of inaction before the Court. First, inaction can also be 
construed as a surrender of a State's sovereignty over a particular case or a 'waiver of 
complementarity.' 63 As discussed above, the principle of complementarity was designed to 
avoid the infringement of States' sovereign rights. In cases of inaction, where no State had 
exercised its jurisdiction, no State sovereignty will be infringed if the Court so decides to 
admit the same. Second, the argument that inaction is inadmissible because it was not 
specifically and expressly provided under article 17, brings to the fore a loophole in the 
admissibility of cases. Indeed, if inaction is not admissible, all rogue States have to do is not 
to lodge any investigation in order to prevent the ICC from intervening. Such setting could 
undetliline the Court's avowed aim to put an end to impunity: whilst States which initiated 
proceedings can be subjected to the ICC's jurisdiction if found unable or unwilling to 
59 See also discussion _in Broomhall, The International Criminal Court: A Checklist for National Implementation 
[1999] 13 Nouvelles Etudes Penales 113 [A Checklist for Implementation hereafter], at p. 144. 
60 Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the Case of the Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo 
[2006) ICC-01/04-01/06. 
61 Ibid., at p. 20-24, para. 35. 
62 Ibid.,at para. 40. 
63 See Kress, 'Self-Referrals' and 'Waiver of Complementarity' Some Considerations in Law and Policy [2004] 
2 JICJ 944. 
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investigate genuinely, those States which opt to remain silent or inactive will be beyond the 
Court's grasp. 
1.1. Four Forms of Inaction 
There are four forms of potentially admissible cases of inaction. 64 The first case of inaction is 
an a priori inaction where no State had initiated any proceeding, pertaining to a situation 
involving one or more of article 5 crimes. 65 This type of inaction is straightforward. It can 
take the form of a State making a declaration that it is not carrying out any proceeding in 
relation to a crime under the jurisdiction of the Court. The case is admissible because no 
investigation had been initiated concerning the commission of a crime under article 5 and 
concomitantly, the perpetrator most responsible for it. It must be noted, nevertheless, that the 
Court on its own motion may yet consider the case involving a priori inaction inadmissible.66 
The second type of inaction is where the ICC admits a situation on the basis that the State 
concerned had voluntarily referred the matter to the Court. A State may, without any attempt 
to initiate a proceeding, refer a situation to the ICC, or after having initiated an investigation 
or prosecution, bring the proceeding to a halt for reasons other than those specified under 
article 17(2) unwillingness and (3) inability, then refer the situation to the Court. Arguably, 
whilst voluntary referral could be seen as evidence of inability, it is not always the case that a 
State which made a voluntary referral is unable within the terms of article 17(3). For instance, 
in the case of Uganda where a voluntary referral to the Court was made with regard to the 
situation in its northern region, the Pre· Trial Chamber II confirmed the Prosecutor's decision 
to initiate an investigation and held that 'the case appears to be admissible, ' 67 that is, despite 
the absence of evidence that the Ugandan authorities were unable to carry out genuine 
proceedings. Whilst the State authorities failed to obtain the suspects, the conflict in the 
northern part of the country does not appear to affect the whole or substantial part of the 
64 See Broomhall, A Checklist for Implementation, op. cit. note 59. 
65 See Obisolo, op. cit. note 14, at p. 147-150. 
66 Article 19( I) of the Rome Statute. 
67 ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber II, Warrant of Arrest for Joseph Kony on 8 July 2005 as Amended 2 7 September 2005 
[2005] ICC-02/04-01/05, at para 38. 
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judicial system and thus, under the terms of article 17(3), the State cannot be regarded as 
unable.68 
The admissibility of voluntary referral is justifiable on the basis that it can reasonably be 
viewed as a surrender of State sovereignty - in effect, upholding the very purpose of the 
principle of complementarity. However, in light of the failure of the Statute to expressly 
provide for its admissibility, the matter of voluntary referral inadvertently raised an issue 
relative to the possible undermining of the right of an accused, as specifically itemized under 
article 19 of the Rome Statute, to challenge the admissibility of such a case. Arsanjani and 
Reisman pointed out that 'a State's consent, expressed in the act of referral, would 
automatically override the statutory right that was [explicitly] granted to the accused. ' 69 
Where it was based on a voluntary referral, an accused's admissibility challenge is deemed to 
fail. The experts in the Informal Paper stated that 'in the clear absence of any investigation or 
prosecution by a State, an admissibility challenge on the grounds of complementary [e.g. that 
a State is carrying out genuine proceedings] would not have any merits.' 70 
It can be argued that an accused's right to challenge the admissibility of a case involving 
inaction should be overridden based on two reasons. First, it can be said that the right to 
challenge the admissibility of a case based on complementarity is only relevant when a 
domestic proceeding had been initiated. To a large extent, the right to challenge was included 
as a safeguard that the ICC would not intervene and step upon a State's sovereign right, that 
is, if the State concerned had exercised its jurisdiction, in the first place. However, if there is a 
voluntary referral from the State that has jurisdiction over the relevant situation, it can be said 
that the State's sovereignty had been waived and thus, an admissibility challenge 'would not 
have any merits.' Second, voluntary referral can be viewed as a clear indication that a State 
does not intend to investigate a situation or prosecute perpetrators. The Preamble to the Rome 
Statute affirmed the States Parties' determination to put an end to impunity for the 
perpetrators of the most egregious international crimes. If it is to give effect to that intention, 
68 See discussion below on article 17(3): Inability, at p. 76-80. 
69 Arsanjani &Reisman, op. cit. note 56, at p. 396. 
70 Informal Expert Paper, op. cit. note 38, at para. 64. 
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the ICC must be able to admit cases where the relevant States expressed resolutions that they 
will not or cannot prosecute. 
It is, however, different if a challenge on admissibility based on complementarity is instigated 
by another State. This scenario is possible in circumstances where there is more than one 
State that has jurisdiction over a particular situation. According to article 19 of the Rome 
Statute, a challenge may be made by 'a State which has jurisdiction over a case, on the 
grounds that it is investigating or prosecuting the case or has investigated or prosecuted.' It is 
submitted that when a challenging State can establish that it is either investigating or 
prosecuting a specific, a voluntary referral by another State that also has jurisdiction over it 
cannot override the former's right to challenge~ in the same manner as the ICC, by virtue of 
the complementarity principle, cannot supersede a State's sovereignty if that same State is 
already investigating or prosecuting genuinely. Voluntary referral is only admissible if no 
other State is genuinely undertaking any proceeding. 
Moreover, in admitting cases solely based on voluntary referral, the ICC may inadvertently 
give a misleading impression to States. It might be taken as a signal that difficult domestic 
cases can be referred to the Court to save States the trouble and resources they would have 
had exhausted, if they were to investigate and prosecute by themselves.71 Concomitantly, it 
can also be argued that admitting cases based on voluntary referral does not seem to be in 
total harmony with the complementarity regime of the Court. The complementarity principle 
is designed to encourage States to deal primarily with domestic situations and cases, 72 ideally 
without any qualification as to how difficult or troublesome a situation or a case may be. The 
complementarity regime is intended to serve 'as a mechanism to encourage and facilitate the 
compliance of States with their primary responsibility to investigate and prosecute core 
crimes.' 73 If voluntary referral is used much too frequently as a basis for admitting a case, it 
71 See Arsanjani Reisman, op. cit .. : voluntary referral 'could encourage governments to extemalise to the Court 
the domestic political problems [ ... ] they do not wish to invest the necessary resources to manage or resolve,' at 
f2 ~~·the Rome Statute 6th Preambular paragraph: 'Recalling that it is the duty of every State to exercise its 
criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes.' 
73 Informal Expert Paper, op. cit. note 38, at para 2. 
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could well mean that States are not carrying out their primary responsibility to adjudicate 
serious international crimes. 74 
Nevertheless, it can be argued that an ICC intervention on the basis of voluntary referral may 
be desirable or even necessary ~ particularly in cases where the article 17 inability criterion 
cannot be satisfied and the national authority concerned seems unable to judicially resolve a 
conflict. 75 It cannot be automatically assumed that a State is capable of carrying out genuine 
proceedings even if, strictly speaking, it does not fall under the inability criterion of article 
17(3). The inability criterion has preconditions to satisfy, one of which is that a State's 
judicial system had wholly or substantially collapsed. However, there may be other causes as 
to why a domestic judicial institution is incapable of dealing with a situation, for reasons 
other than a total or substantial collapsed of its legal order. In order to help end impunity, the 
Court has to exercise its jurisdiction and take on cases that States seem incapable of 
prosecuting. In the Informal Expert Paper, the authors claimed that '[t]here may be situations 
where the appropriate course of action is for a State concerned not to exercise jurisdiction, in 
order to facilitate admissibility before the ICC.' 76 The Office of the Prosecutor in its Policy 
Paper, indicated a similar conviction.77 The Ugandan situation, where the State made a 
voluntary referral, can be taken as an example in this regard. Uganda referred a longstanding 
conflict in its northern region involving the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), which resulted to 
countless and grievous violations of human rights. Up to the present, the government was not 
able to resolve the conflict. The domestic authority had also failed to prosecute perpetrators 
who committed or are still committing crimes that are within the Court's jurisdiction. The 
conflict is even much more complicated with the involvement of neighbouring States such as 
Sudan. Whilst Uganda's 'functional' legal system78 does not render the State as 'unable' 
74 For States' responsibility to investigate and prosecute serious international crimes, see Bassiouni, 
'Accountability for Violations oflnternational Humanitarian Law and Other Serious Violations ofHuman 
Rights' in Bassiouni (Ed.) Post Conflict Justice (Transnational Publisher 2002), at p. 3 and Bassiouni, 'Proposed 
Guiding Principles for Combating Impunity for International Crimes' in Bassiouni, ibid, at p. 255. 
15 See Charney, Editorial Comments: International Criminal Law and the Role of Domestic Courts [200 I] 95 
Amer. J. Int'l L. 120, at p. 122 where the author argued: '[i]n certain cases circumstances, States may find it in 
its interest to allow a prosecution to go forward before the ICC, considering the matter too dangerous to be 
handled domestically and preferring trial before a distant international tribunal.' 
76 Informal Expert Paper, op. cit. note 38, at para.61. 
77 ICC, Office of the Prosecutor, Paper on Some Policy Issues Before the Ojjice of the Prosecutor (ICC-OTP 
2003), Pt. II at p. 5 [OTP Policy Paper hereafter]: 'there may be cases where inaction by States is the appropriate 
course of action. [ ... ] In such cases there will be no question of"unwillingness" or "inability" under article 17.' 
78 US country report on Uganda. 
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under article 17(3), it is apparent that the Ugandan conflict cannot be resolved domestically 
and as such, it can be argued that the admissibility of voluntary referrals, at least in this 
particular case, can be said to be tenable. 
Another issue concerning voluntary referrals revolves around the possibility ofthe ICC being 
used as a political tool by governments. 79 As the ICC is not immune from politics, it was 
argued that governments could opt to make a voluntary referral for their own interests, for 
instance, as a means to escape political embarrassment for failing to resolve a particular 
troublesome case or to expose rebels to the international community. If a situation could not 
be settled after numerous attempts- owing to deeply entrenched political and cultural issues 
which necessitate peace negotiations and settlements as the only feasible solution - in 
referring the situation to the ICC, a government's failure may well thus, become the Court's.80 
The third scenario in which a case might be admitted based on inaction is where there is a pre-
trial amnesty81 or where there is a lack of extradition agreement between States that prevents 
one from carrying out a proceeding. 82 Although pre-trial amnesties were not expressly 
addressed in the Rome Statute, situations where no criminal investigation or prosecution had 
been initiated because an amnesty law is in force can be considered as a form of inaction. 83 As 
with the lack of extradition agreement scenario, this can be regarded as a case of inaction 
where the State concerned does not initiate any proceeding, aware that it will not be able to 
obtain the potential suspect from a custodial State.84 Unless otherwise proven, it is 
inappropriate to brand a State as unwilling to genuinely carry out a proceeding because of the 
existence of a pre-trial amnesty or a lack of extradition agreement which prevent the same 
from prosecuting the accused concerned. Furthermore, the whole purpose of the ICC, to bring 
79 See Arsanjsani & Reismann, op. cit. note 56, at p. 391-397; Cassese, op. cit. note 31, atp. 436; Charney, op. 
cit. note 75; and Kress, op. cit. note 63, at p. 946. 
80 Ibid, at p. 395. 
81 Broomhall, A Checklist for Implementation, op. cit. note 59. 
82 See Olasolo, op. cit. note 14, at p. 166. 
83 See discussion below on article 17(3), Inability. If amnesty was granted after the initiation of a proceeding or 
during prosecution, it may be argued that the amnesty makes a judicial system 'unavailable' under the terms of 
the said subsection, p. 76-80 
84 See discussion below, article 17(3): inability. This scenario where a State cannot carry out prosecution because 
the custodial State refuses to extradite the accused concerned was argued as a potential ground for satisfYing one 
of the conditions of the inability criterion. Whether it will be under the admissibility grounds of inaction depends 
on how the term 'unavailability' will be construed under the said subsection, p. 76-80 
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impunity to a halt, would be undermined if national laws granting pre-conviction amnesties 
can override the Court's authority. 
The fourth possible case of inaction is said to be where a domestic proceeding is being 
undertaken, pertaining to a particular conduct but that the State concerned, had proceeded on 
narrower grounds, in effect, failing to encompass the full extent of the conduct in question. 85 
This scenario could arise when a criminal conduct is treated by a domestic jurisdiction as an 
'ordinary crime' whilst from the perspective of the ICC Prosecutor such conduct constitutes 
an 'international crime. ' 86 For example, a perpetrator may be prosecuted for multiple murders 
based on acts which the Prosecutor regards as genocide. The same conduct, that is, of killing 
several individuals, had been the basis of both allegations, one of multiple murders by the 
State concerned and of genocide by the Prosecutor. It can be pointed out that in the example 
given above, in charging the relevant person with multiple murders and with genocide, there 
is a gap between the scopes of culpability. The latter is much wider and entails a significant 
label on the perpetrator. To the extent where multiple murders have failed to address the 
conduct appropriately, it could be argued that there is inaction on the part of the State that 
exercised its jurisdiction. The Prosecutor can maintain that the span of culpability of multiple 
murders is narrower than genocide to the point which trivialises the act and would result to an 
actual impunity, that is, if the same conduct is not addressed appropriately. 
The extent of how the domestic definition of a crime differs from that of the Rome Statute is 
perhaps of greater significance. If the scope of culpability under the national criminal law is 
fundamentally divergent from the Rome Statute's, then a claim of admissibility based on 
inaction may have more chances of succeeding. The reason as to why a State would treat a 
conduct as an ordinary offence instead of an international crime may also be relevant. As will 
be mentioned below, where it can be established that downplaying a conduct constituting an 
international crime to a mere ordinary offence, is an attempt to shield a perpetrator from his or 
85 Broomhall, A Checklist for Implementation, op. cit. note 59, at p 149. 
86 See Holmes, 'The Principle of Complementarity,' op. cit. note 18, at p. 57 where it was defined: 'ordinary 
crime refers to the situation where the act has been treated as common crime as distinct from an international 
crime having the special characteristic.' This situation must also be distinguished from cases where the 
defendant had already been acquitted or convicted for a crime categorised under 'ordinary crimes' as oppose to 
'international crimes.' Although the main idea of the ne bis in idem principle applies in general, its relevance 
technically speaking concerns cases that were already decided. See discussion below on article 20: ne bis in 
idem, p. 81-7. 
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her actual responsibility, the relevant ground for admissibility is no longer inaction but 
unwillingness under article 17(2). 87 This point is worthy to note, considering that many 
national penal codes do not provide for international crimes. A domestic prosecutor, for 
example, may recognise the seriousness of a conduct as an international crime but within the 
context of the relevant national criminal law, be constrained to charge the accused with an 
ordinary criminal offence. 
It was claimed that a fourth case of inaction may also arise when a State's criminal law allows 
for defences that are too broad in comparison to those available under the Rome Statute. 88 The 
argument goes that the Rome Statute 'could make a case admissible before the Court if 
national law thereby allowed impunity where the Court would punish.'89 For example, an 
acquittal following the successful submission of a particular defence under the national 
criminal law concerned, but that such a defence is much narrower under the Rome Statue,90 
could be seen as a resulting impunity from the point of view of the ICC. It had been argued 
that this instance should be regarded as a potentially admissible case of inaction. On the 
contrary, however, it is submitted that this argument seems unlikely to work. Article 17(1) 
precludes ICC intervention if domestic proceeding had been undertaken or is being carried 
out. If a State claims that it already initiated a prosecution in relation to a specific person and 
conduct, strictly speaking, it can no longer be considered as a case of inaction. It is altogether 
a different matter if the conduct is the one being debated, particularly whether a conduct's 
extent was fully addressed or only in part- in which instance, a State can be said to have 
remained inactive. There is a clear distinction between the subject matter of the inquiry, that 
is, whether a State had dealt or is addressing a situation, the person responsible and the 
conduct in question, and the manner in which a State attends to or had dealt with a case. In 
relation to the admissibility of cases, the use of a domestic law defence, regardless of its 
consistency to the Rome Statute or the lack thereof, does not seem to be of relevance to the 
former question. 
87 See discussion on Unwillingness, at p. 49-7 5. 
88 See Broomhall, International Justice and the International Criminal Court (Oxford University Press 2003) 
[International Justice hereafter], at p. 92. 
89 Ibid 
90 Article 31 of the Rome Statute provides the defences available to defendants. 
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1.2. Inaction and the Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo 
The decision of the Pre-Trial Chamber in the Prosecutor v Dyilo relates to inaction and 
requires a more detailed discussion. The facts of the case involve Thomas Lubanga Dyilo who 
was arrested and detained by the State authority ofthe Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) 
on the basis of several criminal charges under its national criminal law, foremost of which is 
genocide as well as additional crimes of murder, illegal detention and torture.91 Despite the 
domestic proceedings carried out by the State concerned, the Prosecutor claimed that the case 
against the accused is admissible before the ICC. In particular, the Prosecutor alleged that the 
accused was criminally responsible for war crimes which include the following: 
policy/practice of the Union des Patriotes Congolais (UPC)/Forces Patriotiques pour Ia 
Liberation du Congo (FPLC) of enlisting and conscripting children under the age of fifteen 
into the FPLC and using them to actively participate in hostilities. The Pre-Trial Chamber 
held that the case was admissible based on the findings that no State can be considered to 
have initiated a proceeding on the crimes which the Prosecutor specifically identified. The 
Chamber's decision of admissibility was made, despite the fact that the State authority 
initiated proceedings against the same accused. It was pointed out, that the war crimes alleged 
by the Prosecutor was not included or covered by the national proceedings. The Pre-Trial 
Chamber established that for a national proceeding to be held inadmissible, it must 
encompass both the person and the conduct. It was found in the Lubanga Dyilo decision that 
the State had remained inactive in connection to the alleged war crimes because the domestic 
proceedings did not encompass the conduct which the Prosecutor had based his allegation. 92 It 
was further confirmed by the Chamber that there is no need to make an unwillingness or 
inability analysis where no State had acted upon a crime that is within the jurisdiction of the 
ICC. The decision implies a necessary qualification to the complementarity regime of the 
Court, that is, the jurisdiction of the ICC will be only deferred if national proceedings cover 
both the person and the conduct. 
91 Case of Lubanga Dyilo, op. cit. note 60, at para. 33. 
92 Ibid, at para 37: it was held that national proceedings to be inadmissible 'must encompass both the person and 
the conduct'. See also discussion above. 
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The extent of the term 'conduct,' which was not further elaborated by the Pre-Trial Chamber, 
is of immense significance in this regard. In the decision in the Lubanga Dyilo case, the 
manner in which the domestic authority had based its allegation of genocide was different 
from that which the ICC Prosecutor founded his war crimes allegation - although there may 
have been overlaps. The domestic proceedings therefore, did not encompass the specific 
conduct upon which the Prosecutor had alleged war crimes. In that case, the Pre-Trial 
Chamber did not encounter any difficultly in establishing inaction, in spite of the fact that the 
person accused by the State of genocide and by the Prosecutor of war crimes was the same. 
Consequently, where the unwillingness and inability criteria seems impracticable to satisfy 
and the Prosecutor is keen to prosecute a certain perpetrator, in theory, he or she may decide 
to look at another conduct which appears to have been excluded in the national proceeding 
and opt to allege and capitulate to an arguably lesser crime, e.g. war crimes instead of 
genocide. 
However, in the hypothetical example earlier cited relating to the fourth type of inaction -
where a State charged multiple murders, on the one hand, whilst the Prosecutor alleged 
genocide, on the other hand - it seems more complicated, or perhaps impossible, to establish 
an admissible case of inaction. The reason for such is that the conduct of killing several 
persons as addressed by both the State concerned and the Prosecutor is one and the same. The 
difference merely rests upon how that particular conduct was characterised, that is, as 
multiple murders by the domestic authority and as genocide by the Prosecutor. If the term 
'conduct' based on the Lubanga Dyilo 's ruling (that a national proceeding only becomes 
inadmissible before the Court if it encompassed both the person and the conduct) is strictly 
interpreted, then the case example would be inadmissible93 and the fourth possible case of 
inaction would likely be unfeasible. A State, challenging the admissibility of such a case, 
could easily argue that its domestic proceeding had encompassed both the conduct and the 
person, regardless of the fact that the crime being prosecuted domestically is different from 
what the Prosecutor believes it to be. 
On the contrary, a broader reading of the term 'conduct,' that is, to include a qualification as 
to the scope of culpability of a domestic crime, will allow a determination of a case of 
93 Unless unwillingness can be established. See discussion below on Sham Proceedings, at p. 53-67 
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inaction that could be admissible before the Court. For instance, where the allegation of the 
domestic authority and the Prosecutor is based on the same act, in order to establish the 
admissibility of a case, the Prosecutor could maintain that, in charging the perpetrator with 
multiple murders instead of genocide, the conduct was not appropriately addressed - the 
allegation of multiple murders failed to recognise the fact that those killed all belonged to the 
same ethnic group - and as a consequence, the national proceeding failed to encompass the 
conduct in question. A liberal reading of 'conduct' would include the intent of a perpetrator, 
e.g. to exterminate an entire ethic group, as well as the offender's mental state, apart from the 
criminal act per se of shooting to death a certain group of people. This interpretation, if taken 
as the prevalent one, could potentially open a wide discretionary avenue for the Prosecutor as 
well as enable the Court to admit a broader latitude of situations and cases. The Prosecutor, in 
principle, may potentially argue for admissibility on the grounds of inaction on many 
situations by alleging that an international crime had been committed but a concerned State 
had charged the accused with an ordinary crime. This argument is further strengthened by the 
fact that, in the absence of any legal obligation, notwithstanding strong recommendations to 
this effect, many of the member states of the ICC have not put their criminal laws in line with 
the Rome Statute. A number of military codes, for instance, do not encompass the full extent 
of acknowledged international crimes. 94 Disparities between the Rome Statute and national 
criminal laws where 'conduct' is read widely, may open the possibility for admissibility of 
cases in the face of States' efforts to prosecute offenders. 
In looking at the possible broad interpretation of the term 'conduct,' one may consider the ne 
his in idem provision under article 20, which applies to cases that had already been 
adjudicated.95 The ne his in idem article used the term 'conduct' and not 'offence or crime,' in 
prohibiting the Court from prosecuting a person already tried in a national forum. In 
comparison with the ad hoc tribunals, the Statutes of ICTY and ICTR clearly provide that 
there is an exemption from the double jeopardy principle, involving a conduct characterised 
as an ordinary crime in a national court where its perpetrator was domestically prosecuted for 
the same. 96 In other words, if a person was tried for murder based on a particular conduct that 
94 In certain military codes, recruited of child soldiers are not prohibited. See Broomhall, International Justice, 
op. cit. note 79, at p. 91-92. 
95 See also discussion below on article 20, at p. 81-6. 
96 Article 9 and 10 of the Statutes of the ICTY and ICTR. respectively. 
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also constitutes a war crime, he or she may yet be tried again by the ad hoc tribunals. The 
ICTY and ICTR Statutes would thus, allow a retrial if the 'conduct' was not characterised 
instead as an international crime, but rather as an ordinary crime. In contrast, article 20 of the 
Rome Statute has no express provision exempting ordinary crime prosecution from the double 
jeopardy rule. Perhaps, whilst it is unwise to conclude with certainty, it appears that the Court 
would be barred from re-prosecuting a person already charged and tried for an ordinary crime, 
on the basis of a conduct that also constitutes an international crime. 97 Be that as it may, it 
would seem peculiar if a case could potentially be admissible before the ICC on the grounds 
of inaction because a particular conduct was not legally characterised appropriately, i.e. as an 
international crime before the Court. Indeed, this may be possible in cases where judgment 
has yet to be made but otherwise inadmissible, where a domestic court had already acquitted 
or convicted the person concerned. To keep in line with article 20, it may be posited that the 
term 'conduct' vis-0-vis inaction be given a narrow reading, which would thus entail the 
fourth case of inaction improbable. 
Furthermore, the role ofthe Pre-Trial Chamber must be underscored. For a start, the Chamber 
is not legally bound to accept the Prosecutor's legal characterisation of a conduct.98 In other 
words, if the Prosecutor alleges a perpetrator to have committed a particular article 5 crime, 
the Pre-Trial Chamber may decide to admit such a case, even without necessarily agreeing 
with the Prosecutor's label of the conduct. The pivotal role of the Chamber lies in its 
independence from the Prosecutor and primacy in decisions concerning admissibility. 
Interestingly enough, in the absence of any findings on unwillingness or inability, it cannot be 
surmised whether the Court would hold a case inadmissible merely on the strength of its 
disagreement with the Prosecutor's legal characterisation of a conduct. Accordingly, the ICC 
Prosecutor may be encouraged to follow the practice set by the prosecutors of the ad hoc 
tribunals of including several charges of crimes on the basis of a single incident and in so 
doing, enabling the Pre-Trial Chamber to decide which classification or charge, in its view, is 
the appropriate one. 
97 Unless article 20(3) exemptions are satisfied. See discussion in Tallgren, 'Article 20: Ne bis in idem' in 
Triffi:erer (ed) Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Observers' Notes, Article 
~Article (Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft Baden-Baden 1999), at p. 430-1. 
See Lunbanga Dyilo case, op. cit. note 60, at para. 16, p 14. 
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1.3. Other Relevant Factors 
In determining a case of inaction, the Prosecutor has to take other facts into account. First, the 
Prosecutor will have to consider the limited resources of the Court and in particular, the 
Office of the Prosecutor. If careful discretion is not adhered to, it had been widely anticipated 
that the Prosecutor and the Court will respectively be overburdened with referrals and cases. 
Thus, in instances where a State authority is already investigating a particular conduct, 
although different from what the Prosecutor intends to pursue, the latter may discern against 
proceeding further, opting instead, to utilise the Office's limited resources on other priority 
situations. For example, following the commission of crimes under article 5 where the 
concerned State charged the accused with murder, instead of genocide as the Prosecutor may 
allege, the Prosecutor may so decide to withhold his or her investigation. The Prosecutor can 
rest with the assurance that, once convicted, the person will be meted the most severe 
punishment by the national authorities since murder is considered a most serious criminal 
offence in many, if not all, domestic criminal justice systems. Second, the Prosecutor will 
likewise have to consider political factors. In a situation where several crimes under the 
jurisdiction of the Court appear to have been committed by an accused and the concerned 
State, using its discretion, decides to investigate only the most serious conducts - to save time 
and resources ~ such a State may not be enthusiastic towards an intervention by the ICC on 
the grounds of inaction, pertaining to conducts advertently not addressed by the State. In such 
a circumstance, the Court may also be viewed as indirectly pressuring the State concerned to 
deal with a conduct or conducts that the latter earlier decided not to pursue. 
Last but not the least, the crimes alleged by the State and the Prosecutor have a decisive 
impact upon impunity. For example, a State may insist that the ICC give way to its domestic 
jurisdiction as it is already dealing with the same perpetrator - albeit different crimes were 
alleged by the domestic authority and the Prosecutor. For its part, the Prosecutor may counter 
that the said State had, in fact, trivialised a conduct constituting a crime within the Court's 
jurisdiction. The gravity of the crime charged can expediently solve the impasse. If a State 
charged a perpetrator for a crime that is similar or arguably as serious or perhaps, more 
serious as the one being alleged by the Prosecutor, then the Court would likely be inclined 
towards deferring to the national jurisdiction. 
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1.4. Conclusion 
As discussed above, it is imperative that cases of inaction be admitted before the ICC. The 
silence of the Rome Statute with regard to inaction initially raised an important question on 
the very assertion that inaction entails automatic admissibility. The Pre-Trial Chamber, 
however, confirmed the conclusion of the experts in the Informal Expert Paper that when no 
State can be considered to have initiated any proceeding, the case is simply admissible. The 
Chamber, nonetheless, had not elaborated on its ruling concerning national proceedings, in 
particular, as to when a domestic investigation or prosecution encompass both the conduct 
and the person concerned and of equal importance, how the term 'conduct' should be 
construed. Although unlikely, if the term 'conduct,' as established by the Pre-Trial Chamber 
in the Prosecutor v Lubanga Dyi/o, is to be interpreted broadly, many situations and cases 
could potentially be admissible before the ICC. However, in admitting cases of inaction, the 
Court must take cognizance of other factors, including political ones. It is nai've to hold that 
the ICC exists in a social vacuum and is free from politics. Indeed, the admissibility of 
inaction, particularly voluntary referral, can be used by States for their political ends. 
2. Article 17(l)(a) 
2.1 Domestic Proceedings 
The first question concerning article 17(l)(a) is when can it be said that a domestic action, an 
investigation or prosecution, satisfies the complementarity requirement which would, prima 
facie, preclude the Court from activating its otherwise dormant jurisdiction. National criminal 
procedures, to say the obvious, differ from State to State; such being the case, the answer to 
the question depends on the particular procedures obtaining in various States. Since in 
domestic investigations, States have diverse methods of initiating investigations, it would be 
impossible, at least in this study, to survey each and every criminal procedure of all countries 
which acceded or have yet to accede to the Rome Statute. In taking this legal diversity into 
account, it is logically compelling to conclude that the ICC, adhering to the complementarity 
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principle, will construe the earliest step of national authorities vis-a-vis their respective 
investigative procedures as sufficient, prima facie, for it to defer to domestic jurisdiction. To 
suppose otherwise, the ICC may extend itself beyond its complementary role and might be 
viewed as directly or inadvertently discriminating or favouring a particular investigative 
procedure over another. 
To satisfy the complementary requirement, any investigation of a situation must also cover 
both the person and the conduct which appear to be within the Court's mandate, as discussed 
above. In the Prosecutor v Lubanga Dyilo, the Chamber held: 'for a case arising from the 
investigation of a situation to be inadmissible, national proceedings must encompass both the 
person and the conduct. ' 99 The case was decided to be admissible despite the fact that the 
relevant authority had initiated an investigation and had even issued a warrant of arrest 
against the accused for crimes, some of which appear to be within the Court's jurisdiction but 
differed from those which the Prosecutor alleges to have been committed, in relation to the 
case in question. 100 The decisive factor had been that the domestic proceedings 'do not 
encompass the conduct' that the Prosecutor alleged. A situation or a case, therefore, would 
only be rendered inadmissible if the domestic action encompasses both the person and the 
conduct. 
2. 2. Truth Commissions & Other Prosecutorial Alternatives 
The second question relating to article 17(1)(a) concerns domestic proceedings which are not 
primarily for the purposes of criminal prosecution. Beside criminal prosecution and 
punishment, national authorities had devised alternative ways of addressing serious human 
rights and humanitarian violations, the most common of which are Truth and Reconciliation 
Commissions. Truth commissions carry out investigations mainly to establish the facts, for 
instance, what happened during a period of internal armed conflict or war, rather than 
determine culpability, as ordinary or standard criminal investigations commonly aim. They 
99 Ibid, at p. 23. 
100 The Prosecutor alleges the accused for war crimes (for his alleged criminal responsibility ofUPC/FPLC's 
alleged policy of enlisting, conscripting, and using to participate actively in hostilities children under the age of 
15. The State concerned, nevertheless, charged the same accused of genocide. See further discussion above on 
'Inaction,' p. 21-36. 
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seek to compile a record of events from victims or their families, if the former are deceased, 
and likewise from perpetrators. Unlike the ICC or any criminal court, truth commissions put 
emphasis on acknowledging the truth, rather than holding perpetrators accountable to the 
crimes they have committed. 101 Although it can be said that criminal trials like truth 
commissions do disclose the details of an incident, they are, nonetheless, subject to rules of 
evidence which limit the infurmation that can be revealed. 
In exchange, however, for a full account of what happened, truth commissions often offer 
amnesties from prosecution in order to encourage all those involved to come forward and tell 
their stories. Several issues concerning truth commissions are envisaged to bear upon 
admissibility which the Court will have to deal with, sooner or later. The first issue is whether 
truth commission investigations would satisfy the complementarity requirement under article 
17 and would thus, bar the ICC from initiating its own investigation, unless unwillingness or 
inability is proven. The second area of concern revolves on whether it is most desirable and 
beneficial for both the ICC and truth commissions that the Court disregards truth commission 
investigations and amnesties. The latter issue, albeit more of a political and practical than a 
technically legal question, will be a likely factor for the Prosecutor, in deciding whether to 
initiate an investigation, and for the Court, in determining whether such a case should be 
admitted. In spite of these foreseeable issues which were, in fact, raised by a number of states 
during the Rome Conference, most notably South Africa, the Statute made no reference to the 
subject of truth commissions. 
Technically, there is nothing in the Rome Statute which specifies that when a case or a 
situation had been or is being investigated by a truth commission, the ICC is automatically 
precluded from exercising its dormant jurisdiction. On the one hand, it can be argued that 
since the truth commission investigations are not essentially conducted for judicial purposes, 
they cannot be regarded as national proceedings that could satisfy the complementarity 
requirement of article 17(l)(a). Unlike truth commission investigations, the very nature of 
criminal investigations is its view to prosecute. It then follows the argument that a situation 
101 For further and detailed discussion on truth commissions see Olson, Mechanisms Complementing Prosecution 
[2002] 84(845) Int'l Rev. of the Red Cross, available at <www.icrc.org> (last visited 5 January 2006) and 
O'Shea, Amnesty for Crime in International Law and Practice (Kiuwer Law International 2002). 
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investigated by a truth commission can be regarded as a case of inaction. In the absence of an 
intent to prosecute, where there are gathered evidence which reasonably demand prosecution, 
it can be claimed that article 1 7(1 )(a) cannot be satisfied, as no 'criminal' investigation can be 
considered to have been carried out. On the other hand, some truth commission investigations 
are not totally disentangled from judicial purposes and as such, do not do away with the 
possibility of prosecuting persons responsible for serious international crimes. Granting of an 
amnesty by some States are not taken lightly and are even impermissible on certain cases, 
depending on the nature and seriousness of an offence and the surrounding circumstances.102 
Not everyone who had given full disclosure before a truth commission will be granted an 
amnesty; some may be prosecuted on the basis of the account they had given. In this manner, 
it can be maintained that some truth commission investigations in certain instances are 
capable of satisfying article 17(1 )(a) and that situations investigated by truth commissions 
could thus, be held inadmissible, unless the unwillingness and inability criteria are met. 
Accordingly, if the test of admissibility under article 17 can be satisfied, i.e. that a truth 
commission investigation or amnesty was, in reality, found to be for the purpose of shielding 
a specific perpetrator from his or her criminal responsibility, then such a case is admissible 
provided, that other legal requirements are met. As with the first issue, there is therefore, a 
strong case to assert that the Court is not barred from commencing its own investigation by 
virtue of truth commission investigations or amnesties. One might recall, at this juncture, of 
the amnesty accorded to the late Chilean Dictator, Augusto Pinochet. The resulting Statute 
clearly did not reflect any intention to pacify the jurisdiction of the ICC, simply because a 
truth commission is investigating a case or that an amnesty was granted to those responsible 
for the crime(s). 103 
It may, nevertheless, be difficult to prove unwillingness when a truth commission 1s 
investigating a specific case. States could easily argue that truth commissions are not 
designed to prosecute criminals nor shield perpetrators from their culpability, but that their 
102 The South African Truth Commission, for example, requires certain conditions to be met before granting an 
amnesty. Under the Promotion ofNational Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995, section 20(1), among 
others, the conducts committed or acts of omission by a person giving full disclosure of what occurred must be 
related to a political objective. 
103 See Schabas, op. cit. note 28, at p. 69. 
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primary aim is precisely to restore peace and facilitate national reconciliation. 104 To establish 
unwillingness, there has to be evidence equivocally pointing to a contradiction between the 
identified purpose of the truth commission's creation and the real motive behind the 
amnesties given. The nuances involved necessitate that the Court will have to assess each and 
every situation on its own merit. Where blanket amnesties are granted as what happened in El 
Salvador, 105 the ICC should be more wary than when amnesty is given on a case by case 
basis. Moreover, under article 53(1)(c), in determining whether to initiate an investigation, the 
Prosecutor has to take into account if, ~ after a thorough consideration of 'the gravity of the 
crime and the interests of victims ~ there are nonetheless substantial reasons to believe that an 
[ICC] investigation would not serve the interests of justice. Whilst the Court is not technically 
barred from exercising its jurisdiction if a truth commission investigates, article 53(l)(c) 
appears to have refined the discretion of the Prosecutor from taking on cases that would not 
serve the interest of justice. It can be said that the relevant subsection rightly addresses the 
concern of some States, South Africa for example with its successful Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission, as it reassures them that genuine truth commission investigations 
for the purpose of national peace and reconciliation, could dissuade the Prosecutor from 
proceeding with the matter. 106 
Article 53(l)(c) is perhaps, more relevant to the second issue of whether it is most desirable 
that the ICC altogether discount truth commission investigations and amnesties. It can be 
maintained that article 53(l)(c), in effect, compels the Prosecutor, in his or her pursuit of 
justice, to consider questions involving the attendant risks in inadvertently destabilising a 
nation which, having undergone a period of conflict, seeks to reconcile its people through the 
establishment of a truth and reconciliation commission as an appropriate method of doing so. 
Many would attest to the argument that prosecution and punishment are not, in every case, the 
most preferable method of addressing internal or internationally related armed conflicts. 107 
104 See discussion in Roche, Truth Commission Amnesties and the International Criminal Court [2005] 45 Brit. 
J. Criminol. 565, at p. 568. 
105 See Hayner, Fifteen Truth Commissions- 1974 to 1994: A Comparative Study [1994] 16 H. Rts. Quarterly 
597, at p. 627-29. 
106 See discussion in Schabas, op. cit., p. 68-9. 
107 In Alfonsin, 'Never Again' in Argentina [ 1993] 4 Journal of Democracy 19, the Argentinean president held: 
'In the fmal analysis, punishment is one instrument, but not the sole or even the most important one, for forming 
the collective moral conscience.' Furthermore, the Rome Statute itself under article 16 had placed 'peace' above 
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The UN itself had helped push for the establishment of truth commissions and the granting of 
amnesties with the view to restoring peace and order. 108 This struggle between 'peace' and 
'justice' is a recurrent theme in post-conflict resolutions which often involve heretofore 
serious violations of human rights and humanitarian law. 109 To a certain extent, it can be said 
that article 53(1)(c) takes into consideration that which is the seeming counterpart of 
favouring 'justice,' the preference for settlements and peace over prosecution. 1 10 The relevant 
b · b · . f . 111 d I 1· .,u2 t the P t . su section nngs m a sense o pragmatism an rea po ztuc o rosecu or m 
determining which case should be brought before the Court. 
Nonetheless, there had been claims that the Court should rather take a more cooperative 
approach towards truth commissions. 113 One commentator articulated that 'the ICC was 
established to allow the prosecution and punishment of wrongdoers who continue to wield 
power or otherwise simply take advantage of a lawless State, not to gainsay the decisions of 
democratic States such as South Africa, where victims of an authoritarian regime inherit 
power and decide that their prosecutorial resources are best used prosecuting those individuals 
who choose not to apply for amnesty from a truth commission, or who are unable to satisfy 
commission's conditions for the grant amnesty.' 114 In addition, owing to practical limitations, 
the Court's fmite financial resources may mean that it will, out of necessity, set its priorities 
elsewhere rather than jeopardise a nation's movement towards reconciliation. 
It must be noted that it is only right that the Court has the authority to override truth 
commission amnesties if need be, but whether it is most desirable for the ICC to do so will 
'justice' by prohibiting the Court from investigating or prosecuting for 12 months if the Security Council, acting 
under its Chapter VII powers, so decides through a Resolution. 
108 See Scharf, The Letter of the Law: the Scope of the International Obligation to Prosecute Human Rights 
Crimes [ 1996] 59(4) L. Contemp. Probs. 41 and Morris, Accountability for International Crimes and Serious 
Violations of Fundamental Human Rights [ 1996] 59 L. & Con temp. Probs. 29. 
109 See discussion in Sadat, The International Criminal Court and the Transformation of International Law: 
Justice for the New Millennium (Transnational Publishers 2002), at p. 55-58. 
11
° For further discussion, see Brubacher, Prosecutorial Discretion within the International Criminal Court 
[2004] 2 JICJ 71, at p. 80-4. 
111 In Rwanda, for example, after the atrocious incident, the government is faced with significant impediments 
from prosecuting those perpetrators of genocide. In spite of its genuine efforts, appears practically impossible 
with its current state of affair that Rwanda will not be able to prosecute all of them. 
112 See Sadat, op. cit., at p. 69: 'international negotiators eager to bring about a settlement in the hopes of ending 
a bloody conflict will often ignore calls for justice.' 
113 See Roche, op. cit. note 104, at p. 565. 
114 Ibid, at p. 568. 
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depend on the characteristics and background of each case and the nature of the truth 
commission investigations and amnesties. Although it can be said that the genuineness of a 
truth commission's inquiry and amnesty could be a significant or even the ultimate decisive 
factor towards national reconciliation, it is submitted that insofar as impunity is concerned, 
the Court cannot simply rest there. The plethora of factors surrounding the quest for ending 
impunity predisposes the Court to strike a careful balance; for example, so as to avoid 
contributing to a collapse of a fragile State in transition from an oppressive and bloody regime 
to peaceful governance. Finally, it must be emphasised that the silence of the Rome Statue 
pertaining to truth commissions implies that the final determination is left upon the Court's 
sound judgment. Pending actual cases to be brought before its bar, it would be impossible in 
the present study, to precisely predict how the Court will interpret and value truth commission 
investigations and amnesties. 
Albeit the most common, truth commissions are not the only prosecutorial alternative. States 
may have devised other methods of inquiry or investigation which are different from their 
ordinary criminal procedures. For instance, some domestic authorities might have developed 
unconventional processes of accountability for heads of States or government officials. 115 A 
parliament, for example, could summon a committee to carry out an inquiry involving a 
political leader who is suspected of instigating one of the crimes under article 5, and 
subsequently, decide whether the matter has to be referred to legal authorities for judicial 
prosecution. Other examples are cultural or traditional customs used to resolve conflicts. In 
Rwanda, for instance, the Gacaca system was established to cope with the overwhelming 
number of cases which resulted from the atrocious incident in 1994.116 Under staffed and 
financially constrained, the Rwandan domestic courts are unlikely to deal with all the pending 
genocide-related cases. To expedite the processes of justice and reconciliation, the 
government adopted a judicial method based on a popular indigenous f{}ffim used for conflict 
resolution within a given community. The Gacaca tribunals do not employ standard methods 
115 Bassiouni, The Legislative History of the International Criminal Court: Introduction, Analysis, and 
Integrated Test, Vol. 1 (Transnational Publishers 2005), p. 134-5. 
116 For further information on Gacaca courts, see inter alia: Amnesty International, Rwanda: Gacaca: A 
Question of Justice, 17 Dec:. 2002 (available at <h!!Q://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engafr470072002> last 
visited 10 Jan. 2007); Boed, 'The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda' in Bassiouni (ed), Post-Conflict 
Justice (Transnational Publishers 2002, at p. 495-6; Corey & Joireman, Retributive Justice: The Gacaca Courts 
in Rwanda [2004] 103 African Affairs 73, at p. 81-4; Ellis, The International Criminal Court and its Implication 
for Domestic Law and National Capacity Building [2002-2003] 15 Fla. J. lnt'l L., at p. 15. 
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in dealing with criminal cases, yet they are vested with wide ranging legal powers. 117 If given 
that the said system appears to help reduce impunity and that the unwillingness or the 
inability criteria under article 17(2) and (3) cannot be established, how would the ICC 
Prosecutor or the Pre-Trial Chamber perceive such a system? Is it sufficient to argue that a 
proceeding such as that provided under the Gacaca system cannot be considered a domestic 
proceeding under article 17(1 )(a) because of its unconventional characteristics, not to mention 
its inconsistency relative to prevailing norms of internationallaw?118 If so, would that render 
a case admissible on the grounds that the State concerned had not acted? The ICC will soon 
encounter and decide eventually on varied mechanisms of accountability, some of which may 
be significantly different from standard domestic criminal investigations. Sans precedence, 
these queries will have to wait for answers as to how the Court, once confronted with actual 
situations, will interpret them. 
3. Article 17(1)(b) & (c) 
Article 17(1 )(b) stipulates that a case is not admissible, subject to exemptions, if it had 
already been investigated and that the domestic authority decided not to prosecute. The 
exemptions are founded upon the satisfaction of the Court that the decision by the concerned 
State not to proceed with any legal action was a result of unwillingness or inability. As the 
complementarity jurisdiction of the Court is hinged upon the 'genuineness' of a proceeding, a 
decision not to prosecute, following an investigation because of insufficient evidence or 
where it is not in the interest of justice, would satisfy article 17(1 )(b). As for article 17(1 )(c), 
it provides that a case which had already been prosecuted is not admissible. This subsection, 
citing article 20, upholds the rule against double jeopardy or the ne bis in idem principle, 
which is codified under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (JCCPR 
hereafter). 119 However, it is also subject to exemptions, albeit more restrictive than article 
17(l)(a) and (b), under article 20(3) of the Rome State. 
117 See Corey & Joireman, ibid; Daly, Between Punitive and Reconstructive Justice: the Gacaca Courts in 
Rwanda [2002] 34 NYU J.Int'l. L. and Pol. 355; and Amnesty International, ibid. See also discussion below at 
~- 61-2. 
18 Amnesty International, ibid. 
119 Article 14 ofthe ICCPR (1976) UNTS 171. 
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Concerning admissibility of cases and the principle ne his in idem, the ICC seemed 
permanently precluded from intervening in cases that had already been properly prosecuted 
but, nonetheless, the perpetrator was subsequently pardoned. 120 If the exemptions under 
article 20, ne his in idem provision, cannot be met with satisfaction, then the Court would be 
barred from intervening and commencing a retrial. An example used in this regard was the 
case of William Calley, who was convicted ofwar crimes in the 1970s but was later pardoned 
after serving only a brief period of his detention. 121 If a similar case arises today, where the 
convicted had not been justly punished, the ICC, where it cannot establish unwillingness 
under article 20, will be barred from intervening and consequently, its main objective to end 
impunity would thus, be undermined. 
4. Article 17(l)(d) 
Article 17(1)(d) renders it mandatory, with the use ofthe term 'shall,' that the Court declares 
inadmissible, cases that are found not of sufficient gravity. An appreciation of what is meant 
by 'not of sufficient gravity' involves examining both the conduct and the nature of the crime 
and the offender to be investigated or prosecuted. 122 In The Prosecutor v Luhanga Dyilo123, 
the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber formulated three questions to help determine whether a case had 
satisfied the gravity threshold. A case is said to be of sufficient gravity if the following 
questions can be answered positively: 124 
'i) Is the conduct which is the object of a case, systematic or large-scale (with due 
consideration of the social alarm caused to the international community by the relevant 
type of conduct)? ; 
120 See discussion in Tallgren, op. cit. note 97, at p. 434 and Ellis, op. cit. note 116, at p. 235. 
121 See Schabas, op. cit. note 28, at p. 70. 
122 In a number of decisions, the ICTY and ICTR made determinations as to a case's seriousness based on 
considerations of the nature of the crime involved and the offender to be prosecuted. See for example the 
Prosecutor v Zdravko MUCIC, Hazim DEL/C eta/ (also known as 'Ce/ebici '), ICTY -96-21, Appeal Judgment 
and the Prosecutor v Akayesu, ICTR-96-4-A, Appeals Chamber. 
123 Op. cit. note 60. 
124 Ibid, at p. 32, para. 63. 
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ii) Considering the position of the relevant person in the State entity, organisation 
or armed group to which he belongs, can it be considered that such person falls within 
the category of most senior leaders ofthe situation under investigation?; and 
iii) Does the relevant person fall within the category of most semor leaders 
suspected of being most responsible, considering ( 1) the role played by the relevant 
person through acts or omissions when the State entities, organisation or armed groups to 
which he belongs, commit systematic or large-scale crimes within the jurisdiction of the 
Court, and (2) the role played by such State entities, organisations or armed groups in the 
overall commission of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court in the relevant 
situation?' 
The first of the three questions concerns the conduct or the nature of the crime involved and 
the other two questions relate to the relevant person being investigated or to be prosecuted. 
4.1. The Conduct and Nature of the Crime Involved 
The Pre-Trial Chamber, in the same case, held that the gravity requirement under article 
17(l)(d) is 'in addition to the drafters' careful selection of the crimes' 125 included in the Rome 
Statute and the Preamble's dire<:tion that the Court's material jurisdiction is 'limited to the 
most serious crimes of international concern.' 126 This means that a conduct which appears to 
constitute a violation under article 5 of the Rome Statute and thus, considered a serious 
international crime, will not automatically be admissible before the Court. Notwithstanding 
the fact that the ratione mat erie of the ICC is limited to serious international crimes, the Court 
is yet compelled to closely examine cases brought to its attention and admit only the ones 
which involve the most grievous conducts, among the crimes included in article 5. In practice, 
a future defendant who committed crimes against humanity, can possibly argue that the crime 
alleged against him, albeit categorised under article 5 and therefore, considered as a grave 
international crime, is not serious enough to activate the Court's dormant jurisdiction. The 
Chamber maintained that 'the conduct must present particular features which render it 
125 Ibid., at p. 24, para. 41. 
126 Preamble to the Rome Statute. 
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especially grave.' 127 These features to which the Court are to consider are contained in the 
first question, quoted above. 
Firstly, the conduct must have been performed systemically or in large scale. Systemic would 
mean that there is an evidence of a 'pattern of incidents' or similarities among several events. 
As for large scale, the Court must take into account key information such as the number of 
deaths which resulted from the criminal enterprise against the population of an area. Both are 
evidential matters to which the Prosecutor will have to discharge. Secondly, the Pre-Trial 
Chamber cited that consideration should be given to the extent of 'social alarm' that a specific 
conduct has triggered in the international community. Social alarm refers to the response, 
reaction or concern of the international community towards the crime concerned. The fact, for 
instance, that the UN Security Council deliberated over an atrocity may well imply that such 
infarction is of international concern. However, social alarm seems to be a relatively 
peripheral concern and to a certain extent, contingent upon the first requirement, i.e., that the 
conduct in question must be systematic or large scale. The fact that a criminal enterprise is 
systematic or large scale usually involves raising an alarm to the international community. 
4.2. The Person Investigated or to be Prosecuted 
It had been said that the term 'not of sufficient gravity' under article 17(l)(d) entails that the 
Court is only to prosecute those who bear the greatest responsibility for the atrocity 
committed. 128 The second and third questions help determine whether a case is of sufficient 
gravity by examining the position of the accused and the role he or she played in the atrocity 
under investigation. The second question inquires whether an accused held a high senior 
leadership over the State entity or the organisation alleged to have committed a systematic or 
large scale criminal act. It must be underscored, however, that holding a high senior 
leadership position is not a sufficient basis per se to conclude that such leader bore the 
greatest responsibility. The third question further directs a consideration as to the actual role 
or contribution of such a leader, the State entity or organisation to which he or she holds a 
127 Lubanga Dyilo case, op. cit. note 60, p. 26, para 45. 
128 Morris, The Trials ofConcurrent Jurisdiction: the Case of Rwanda [1997] 7 Duke J. ofComp. & lnt'l. L. 
349, at p. 366. 
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position, m the overall criminal enterprise. The Pre-Trial Chamber also cited that the 
application of the two questions pertaining to the perpetrator was rooted upon the fact that 
those senior leaders who played essential roles in the commission of systemic or large scale 
wrongdoings are also the ones who could 'most effectively prevent or stop the commission' 
of such crimes. 129 
Following the establishment of the ICC, the Prosecutor released a policy paper where it was 
indicated that he 'will initiate prosecutions [ ... ] for leaders who bear most responsibility' and 
'encourage national prosecutions [ ... ] for lower ranking perpetrators.' 130 Prior to the 
Prosecutor's policy paper and the Pre-Trial Chamber's decision in Lubanga Dyilo, a legal 
commentator raised the issue of whether a lack of leadership position on the part of the 
defendant can form the basis for a claim of inadmissibility. 131 In accordance with the 
Chamber's judgment and the Prosecutor's policy paper, not only would a future defendant be 
able to argue that the case against him or her is inadmissible for his or her lack of high 
leadership status but that such a suspect will unlikely reach the Pre-Trial Chamber for an 
admissibility determination. 
One may, nevertheless, call into question the necessity of requiring a 'senior leadership 
position.' Albeit in most cases it is often the political, military, or armed group leaders who 
are behind systemic undertakings of humanitarian and human rights violations, can it be 
argued that the gravity of the crime and the vital role played by a person could compensate for 
his or her lack of a more senior leadership rank? The policy paper indicated that in 'some 
cases the focus of an investigation by the OffiCe of the Prosecutor may go wider than high-
ranking officers if, for example, investigation of certain types of crimes or those officers 
lower down the chain of command is necessary for the whole case.' 132 This seems to be 
inconsistent with the three questions formulated by the Pre-Trial Chamber in Lubanga. 
However, in any case if a future Chamber decides to discount the ruling in Lubanga, an 
admissible case involving one who holds no senior ranking would be of exceptional nature. 
129 Lubanga Dyilo case, at para 60. 
130 OTP Policy Paper, op. cit. note 77, Sept. 2003. 
131 Morris, op. cit., at p. 366-7. 
132 OTP Policy Paper, op. cit. note 77, p. 3. Another reason, one might cite, for pursuing individuals who hold no 
senior leadership position is that it may ultimately lead to relevant information concerning their superiors. See 
also Schrag, Lessons Learned from ICTY Experience [2004] 2 TICJ 427. 
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Furthermore, could it be maintained that ICC's principal purpose to reduce impunity does not 
necessarily imply prosecuting only those with senior leadership status but rather, to exercise a 
complementary jurisdiction when States are unable or unwilling to carry out genuine 
proceedings?133 In accordance with the Pre-Trial Chamber's decision, the Court is only to 
adjudicate those who hold senior leadership positi{)ns. 
4.3. The Rationale for the Gravity Threshold 
First and foremost, the gravity threshold is justified because it is consistent with the Court's 
deterrent role to prevent serious international crimes from occurring in the future. It was held 
in Lubanga Dyilo decision that by focusing on senior leaders wh{) perpetrated grave 
international crimes 'can the deterrent effects of the activities of the Court be maximised 
because other senior leaders in similar circumstances will know that solely by doing what 
they can to prevent the systemic or large-scale commission of crimes within the jurisdiction 
of the Court, can they be sure that they will not be prosecuted by the Court.' 134 In prosecuting 
senior leaders, the ICC sends a prominent message to potential perpetrators that even those in 
power are not beyond the reach of the international oommunity. Moreover, in the same 
decision, the Pre-Trial Chamber concluded that the Court's retributory role must oome second 
to its deterrent or preventive function. 
It must be underscored, however, that in not prosecuting perpetrators of international crimes, 
owing to his or her lack of any leadership position, alongside the inability to function of the 
national court that has jurisdiction over such an offender, a message of deterrence is 
inadvertently suppressed. In response to this issue, the other rationale for upholding the 
gravity threshold can be cited. The ICTY Appeals Chamber succinctly stated: 'in any 
criminal justice system, the entity responsible for prosecutions has finite financial and human 
resources and cannot realistically be expected to prosecute every offender which may fall 
133 In ibid, it was recognized the possibility of leaving an 'impunity gap' in focusing on those most responsible 
for the crime, 'unless national authorities, the international community and the Court work together to ensure 
that all appropriate means for bringing other perpetrators to justice are used.' 
134 Lubanga Dyilo case, op. cit. note 60, at Para. 54. 
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within the strict terms of its jurisdiction.' 135 Taking the experience of the ICTY as example, 
one would observe that a lot of the tribunal's resources were consumed and its system was 
overstrained because the ICTY had focused on pursuing low ranking individuals, with 'not 
enough attention paid at the outset to limiting the number' of such prosecution. 136 The ICC, 
with its wide territorial jurisdiction and its limited financial resources, cannot be expected to 
investigate or prosecute each and every alleged offender of article 5 crimes. As it is, the Court 
would reasonably opt to investigate or prosecute only those perpetrators most responsible for 
committing remarkably serious crimes. The regrettable reality is that some perpetrators of 
serious international crimes may go unpunished when national courts are unable or unwilling 
to prosecute them and the ICC, for its part, is tied down with priority cases that are considered 
to be of exceptional gravity. 
B. Article 17(2): Unwillingness 
The question of unwillingness arises when a State had initiated a proceeding, where it is 
investigating or had investigated but decided not to prosecute and likewise, where it is 
prosecuting a case. The three criteria to which a State can be said to be unwilling include: (i) 
where a domestic proceeding is a mere sham, that is, for the purpose of shielding a perpetrator 
from his or her criminal responsibilities; (ii) where there are unjustified delays, making the 
proceeding inconsistent with an intention to investigate or prosecute genuinely; and (iii) 
where there is a lack of independence and impartiality in conduct or manner of the 
proceeding, contradicting the intent to genuinely carry out a legal action. Article 17(2) 
provides that a mere initiation of a proceeding does not bar the ICC from intervening. The 
complementarity regime of the Court requires a genuine effort on the part of the State 
concerned. It lays the grounds to which the Court may step in on the face of the States' sham 
or un-genuine efforts to investigate or prosecute. 
135 Prosecutor v Zdravko MUCIC, Hazim DELJC eta/ (also known as 'Ce/ebici'), ICTY-96-21, Appeal 
Judgment, at para. 602. 
136 Schrag, op. cit. note 132, at p. 30. 
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Establishing that a State is unwilling may involve a truly challenging task for the Prosecutor. 
If the standard criteria for determining admissibility were criticised as being too high, 137 to 
prove unwillingness, in particular sham proceedings, would garner the highest point. The 
Court has to be satisfied that the State concerned intended to protect the accused from his or 
her criminal culpability or that a lack of intention on the part of the State to conduct a bona 
fide proceeding is obtaining in the instance. Proving unwillingness requires examining a 
State's intent to investigate or prosecute genuinely or the lack thereof. 138 A subjective enquiry 
is thus, inevitable which makes the task inherently difficult. 
According to article 17(2), in considering unwillingness, the Court must give regard to 'the 
principles of due process recognised by international law.' The real extent of this phrase in 
practice is arguably uncertain. On the one hand, during the negotiation, State delegations 
voiced their concern that the ICC might in tum pass judgments on the due process that States 
elect to have in handling domestic criminal matters. On the other hand, the Court has to be 
aware of domestic criminal justice systems which tend to overdo due process. In being 
exceedingly lenient towards the accused, national courts may reinforce a culture of impunity; 
their excessively liberal approach might be abused to shield perpetrators from their criminal 
responsibilities. In determining this criterion, however, the Court is compelled to be prudent 
against easily conferring unwillingness upon an acting State which is taking steps to ensure 
that the rights of suspects or the accused are respected and similarly, to be cautious of States 
which excessively favour due process. The phrase indicates to the ICC judges that the 
standard of due process to be applies is that 'recognised by international law.' However, the 
fact that it is 'recognised by international law' does not help clarify the definitive extent of the 
term. In application, the phrase might end up undermining its own value as an interpretative 
tool because ofits broad and uncertain scope. 139 
137 See Arbour & Bergsmo, 'Conscious Absence of Judicial Overreach,' in von Hebel et. a/. (eds.) Reflections on 
the International Criminal Court (T. M. C. Asser Press 1999). 
138 See Olasola, op. cit. note 14, at p. 151 and Arbour & Bergsmo, ibid, p. 129: 'the prosecutor must prove a 
devious intent on the part of a State, contrary to its apparent actions.' 
139 See Olasola, ibid, p. 152. 
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Concomitant to the difficulty involved in proving unwillingness is the fact that an accusation 
charging a State as unwilling is a very serious allegation. 140 In a manner of speaking, the 
admissibility determination places a domestic legal system on trial. 141 It is very likely that an 
accusation of that nature would cause political embarrassment on the part of the State. 142 
However, the very same State which in all likelihood, become politically mortified, is also 
expected to eventually cooperate with the Court in the gathering of relevant information and 
evidence as well as in arresting the accused, that is, if such person had not yet been obtained. 
As Cameron pointed out, the Prosecutor could be in a 'paradoxical' position, 'having to show 
first that the State is not acting in good faith and then, under article 86 to seek cooperation of 
that same State.' 143 One may thus, be justified in asking whether States accused of being 
unwilling will, in fact, cooperate with the Court. 144 It is also interesting to consider the 
possible political repercussion in alleging that a State is unwilling, upon the Prosecutor or 
even the Court. Whilst in principle, such a backlash is precluded, nevertheless, it would not be 
surprising if there will be relatively fewer cases which will be admitted to the ICC on grounds 
of unwillingness, compared to cases of inaction or inability. Perhaps, the innate difficulty lies 
in examining a State's subjective intention or its lack of intent but it seems na'ive to assume 
that the Prosecutor or the Court is free from political considerations - more so, if somewhere 
along the course, the State charged is expected to cooperate with the ICC. Indeed, State 
cooperation may become precarious when the State concerned, in the first place, expressed 
refusal to cooperate with the ICC because it disagrees with the Prosecutor's allegation of 
unwillingness. Without state cooperation, the investigation and prosecution may seriously be 
jeopardized; in such a situation, the Court may well consider putting the matter before the 
Assembly of States or the Security Council, in instances when the latter previously referred 
the situation to the Prosecutor. 
140 See Informal Expert Paper, op. cit. note 38, at para. 44: 'politically sensitive (amounting to an accusation 
against the authorities).' 
141 Arbour, The Challenges of Litigation in the 2 r' Century: From the ad hoc Tribunals to the International 
Criminal Court (Address to the American Bar Association, Toronto ( 1998)) [ 1998] ICTY Y.B. 445, at 446. 
142 See Summers, op. cit. note 1, at p. 76, where it was said that an unwillingness 'determination by the ICC 
would be a slap in the face of any State that had requested the Court to defer to its national jurisdiction.' 
143 See McGoldrick eta/. (Ed.), The Permanent ICC, op. cit. note 2, at p. 92. 
144 In Cassese, op. cit. note 31, at p. 435 it was mentioned: 'the ICC relies heavily upon State cooperation, to the 
extent that it might be crippled in the absence of such cooperation' [emphasis added]. 
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Although it was stated in the Informal Expert Paper that 'the ICC is oot a human rights 
monitoring body and its role is oot to ensure perfect procedures and compliance with all 
international standards,' one cannot underestimate the future role of international human 
rights in the admissibility of cases. 145 In any case, a national proceeding that gravely breaches 
the minimum standards of international human rights law may give the Prosecutor an 
impression that such a proceeding is not genuine. For example, biased proceedings which are 
tilted in favour of the accused, may serve as gauge of the lack of independence and 
impartiality. In the fmal analysis, the ultimate determination of admissibility is rooted upon 
the available evidence showing a State's intent to stage a sham proceeding or its lack of intent 
to investigate or prosecute genuinely. Nevertheless, the current structure of the international 
human rights system and the extent to which human rights monitoring bodies have developed, 
alongside the active role of established non-governmental organisations (NGO) in monitoring 
human rights violations, it is highly possible that the Prosecutor and the Court would maintain 
a constant reference to human rights in assessing whether or not a State is unwilling. 146 
As earlier mentioned, the unwillingness criterion is essentially contingent upon the evidence 
on hand. The evidentiary burden on the part of the Prosecutor, however, brings vital questions 
to the fore which are not addressed by the Rome Statute. Foremost of these queries deals with 
how much weight of evidence would suffice for an allegation of unwillingness to succeed. As 
regards to the standard of proof, the Informal Expert Paper recommended that the appropriate 
standard for admissibility is the balance of probability. 147 It was reasoned that the issue does 
not refer to a person's guilt but rather, the objective is to determine whether a case is 
admissible. Thus, if the Court applies the experts' logic, it is not necessary for the Prosecutor 
to prove that a State is unwilling beyond reasonable doubt but a mere preponderance of proof 
indicating that the proceeding is a sham would be sufficient to establish unwillingness. 
145 The Informal Expert Paper, op. cit. note 38, at paras. 23 & 49. 
146 See McGoldrick eta/. (Ed.), op. cit. note 2, at p. 87: '[a}n indirect result of the adoption of the [Rome] Statute 
is that the reports of the UN special country rapporteurs and Commission and Sub-Commission them rapporteurs 
on the administration of justice may well receive close reading in the future.' 
147 See the Informal Expert Paper, op. cit. note 33. 
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An assessment of unwillingness would have to be based on procedural grounds. 148 For 
example, the Prosecutor may infer unwillingness on the grounds that a national authority had 
failed to disclose a piece of significant evidence contrary to the domestic criminal procedure 
concerned. Pending precedence, it would be interesting to see how the ICC will proceed in 
cases where an accused who had been accorded a fair investigation but will not be prosecuted, 
despite the existence overwhelming evidence against him or her, because the national 
authority had made an honest mistake in its decision. 149 As a matter of fact, 'mistakes' in 
domestic criminal proceedings do occur without necessarily amounting to a shielding of a 
person from criminal responsibilities. Will the ICC be able to argue that a 'mistake' was so 
obvious that there appears to be a purpose to shield a perpetrator from conviction? Although 
there is no concrete limit as regards the proof that could be used to establish unwillingness, 
strict adherence to the terms of article 17 denotes that only when a national proceeding is not 
genuine can the ICC intervene. Thus, if a proceeding is genuine and the 'mistake' is also 
genuine, then the Court will unlikely be able to satisfy the unwillingness criteria. The travaux 
preparatoires are also inclined toward the view that the ICC is not to act as an appellate court 
in cases where domestic forums committed mistakes in the administration of justice. 
1. Article 17(2)(a): Sham Proceedings 
It is technically difficult to establish that a domestic proceeding is geared at shielding a person 
from criminal culpability. A sham investigation or prosecution is a proceeding not having its 
supposed character or simply not genuine. 150 In practical terms, this refers to situations where 
the suspect or accused is indirectly or covertly being favoured, or that there is a likelihood 
that the suspect will not be prosecuted or will be acquitted, or if the same will be prosecuted, 
he or she will not be meaningfully convicted. A mere intent to protect a perpetrator from the 
consequences of his criminal conduct, as evidenced, for instance, by a government official's 
statement, if not acted upon by the relevant domestic authorities would not constitute 
148 Ibid, at para 46. 
149 See discussion in McGolrick, op. cit. note 2, at p. 87. 
150 In the Informal Expert Paper, op. cit. note 38, the definition of genuineness was taken from the oxford 
dictionary. 
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unwillingness on the part of the State. To establish unwillingness 'the prosecutor must prove a 
devious intent on the part of a State, contrary to its apparent actions.' 151 
1.1. Potential Indicia 
A finding of an intention to obviate legal sanctions against the criminal deeds of a perpetrator 
must be based on objective and perceptible grounds or indicia, confirming that the relevant 
domestic proceeding is far removed from being genuine. The sham proceeding as a criterion 
is by itself broad and could be, arguably arrived at, after a thorough examination of different 
and vast indicia. The following indicia, mostly drawn from the Informal Expert Paper, are to 
serve as potential evidence to which the Court may draw an inference of unwillingness. It 
remains upon the Pre-Trial Chamber, however, to discern which particular evidence is crucial 
or how much indicia would result to a finding of unwillingness. Perhaps, considering the 
seriousness of the allegation that a State is not acting in good faith, a combination of two or 
several indicia will be required, depending on the strength of each evidence obtained. 
• Reluctance to cooperate with the ICC - When the Prosecutor so decides to commence 
an investigation of a situation, he or she may request the relevant State that has 
jurisdiction over the matter, to provide the needed information. Should the State refuse 
to grant the Court's request, would the Prosecutor be able to draw an inference of 
unwillingness to cooperate with the ICC? According to the Informal Paper, there is a 
possibility that 'reasonable inferences might of necessity be drawn if information cannot 
be collected because of non-cooperation.' 152 The evidence to which unwillingness can 
be established is said to be vast. As mentioned above, an allegation of unwillingness 
may concomitantly lead to political issues and a State may well refuse to cooperate 
because of these reasons. An adverse inference could be necessary in cases where, for 
example, a State's reluctance to provide information to the Prosecutor appears to 
emanate from a desire to conceal critical information which may incriminate certain 
personalities. However, the lack of State cooperation may be due to its failure to 
develop the necessary implementing or enabling legislation. In view of this possibility, 
151 Arbour & Bergsmo, op. cit. note 137, at p. 129, 131. 
152 Informal Expert Paper, op. cit., at p. 10, para 30. 
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the Prosecutor must be mindful of the difference between a state's reluctance to 
cooperate because it has yet to properly implement the ICC requirements or its refusal is 
correlated to an intent or a devious plan to ensure that the accused will not be 
sanctioned. Nonetheless, it is questionable whether an inference of unwillingness based 
on a State's refusal to cooperate is in itself adequate to satisfy article 17(2)(a). 
• Procedural Irregularities - Uncommon departures from the standard criminal procedure 
concerning serious crimes may create suspicion as to whether the domestic proceeding 
being undertaken or carried out by a State authority is truly genuine. 153 For example, if 
under its normal criminal procedures investigations involving grave offences are usually 
carried out for about 1 year, whilst in a particular case, an authority, by means of 
bypassing normal procedures, completed a criminal investigation in an unusually short 
period of time, a reasonable inference may be drawn from the procedural irregularity. In 
this instance, it can be held that the authority concerned intends to fast track the 
proceeding, risking the possibility of not being able to gather crucial and relevant 
evidence, and in so doing, increasing the likelihood of an acquittal of the accused. It had 
also been cited that deviations from the standard procedures may occur when a special 
investigator is employed or when a case is transferred to a 'secret tribunal.' 154 
One may nevertheless note that in considering procedural irregularities, the standard 
used would seem to be that of the domestic legal system. In other words, departures 
from the usual procedures become known when scrutinized in relation to how the 
relevant criminal justice system normally handles cases involving serious crimes. The 
argument that the standards must adhere to the international criminal procedure is 
untenable. In the first place, there is no existing comprehensive and concrete 
international criminal procedure model which can be used as a frame reference. Even 
the standards in international human rights cannot be adopted because of diverging 
principles; at best, their relevance to criminal law will only be to a limited extent. 
Second, States do have varying criminal procedures. A normal procedure in one 
153 Ibid, at p. 14 and Holmes, 'Complementarity: National Courts versus the ICC' in Cassese, Gaeta & Jones 
(eds.), The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: a Commentary (Oxford University Press 2002), at 
E· 675. 
54 Holmes, ibid 
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jurisdiction could be perceived as an irregularity in another. In the United Kingdom, for 
example, the procedure for serious cases during the pre-trial phase is much faster than in 
most legal systems in continental Europe. 155 In Italy, Germany and France, pre-trial 
proceedings for cases involving grave offences take, by far, much longer. From the 
point of view of an English lawyer, the delays in the continental system are 
extraordinary. Whilst from the perspective of continental judiciary, it could be claimed 
that the pre-trial phase in English criminal procedure is 'insufficiently rigorous to make 
sure that all the evidence has been properly examined in advance in a case where the 
facts are grave or complicated.' 156 The point rendered from the example is that a 
procedural irregularity could be relative, unless measured in relation to how a particular 
legal system operates. 
As States have different investigative and prosecutorial procedures, it could therefore be 
observed that the Prosecutor might find it easier to detect procedural irregularity in 
certain jurisdiction than in others. Some national legal systems, for example, bestow 
much greater discretion on authorities in the conduct of investigations, whilst in others 
judicial authorities may have to follow a rigid procedural scheme. It would thus, be less 
demanding to find an irregularity in the latter than in comparison to the former. Indeed, 
this may appear unfair for some domestic systems. Nevertheless, it is a fact that States 
do not have uniform criminal procedures and that the Prosecutor, in determining 
unwillingness, will ultimately be looking at the genuineness of a proceeding. If a 
procedural irregularity is found, the Prosecutor must yet essentially link it to an intent to 
shield a perpetrator from criminal conviction. 
• Institutional Deficiencies - In considering institutional deficiencies, the Prosecutor or 
the Court must be cautious in drawing inferences of unwillingness. The Court must not 
be seen as passing judgments on a State's legal order. In including institutional 
deficiency as potential indicia, the authors of the Informal Paper cited its relevance 
where there is a 'political subordination of investigative, prosecutorial or judicial 
155 See discussion in Spencer, 'Introduction' in Delmas-Marty & Spencer (eds.), European Criminal Procedures 
(Cambridge University Press 2002), at p. 33. 
156 See ibid, at p. 34. 
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branch.' 157 Bearing in mind what history had shown in which many perpetrators of 
massive and systematic human rights and humanitarian violations are State leaders 
themselves, the Prosecutor may be justified in being wary towards systems where the 
executive branch has significant and unreasonably excessive influence over the judicial 
body. In assessing judicial independence, it is likely that the Pre-Trial Chamber will rely 
on the standards set forth in the Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary158 
which was adopted by the UN. Moreover, lack of transparency could also be taken as 
indicia in proving unwillingness on the part of the State. 
• Inadequacy of Action - As much as inadequacy of action by a State can be used as 
evidence of inability, it could also be taken as a proof of unwillingness to carry out a 
genuine proceeding. Again the potential issue in this regard is from which yardstick can 
it be established whether the steps taken by a State is adequate. First one may postulate 
the possibility of referring to the standards of international human rights. 159 To reiterate 
what was said in the Informal Expert Paper, the ICC is not tasked to ensure strict 
compliance with the human rights standards. The standard of whether an investigation 
or prosecution is genuine is different from whether a State had fulfilled the minimum 
requirements of international human rights norm. Second, a specific action's adequacy 
should be measured in reference to domestic standards, that is, as to how a particular 
State conducts proceedings involving cases of serious gravity. The inherent difficulty 
lies with the fact that standards vary from State to State. 
• Lack of Parallel Legal Characterisation - It is possible that a State intentionally or by 
virtue of the fact that its domestic criminal law does not provide for crimes of 
international nature, prosecutes a perpetrator for an 'ordinary' offence as opposed to a 
grave international crime. An example is where a person who inflicted heinous conducts 
157 The Informal Expert Paper, op. cit. note 38, at p. 14. 
158 Adopted by the Seventh UN Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders held in 
Milan from 26 August to 6 September 1985 and endorsed by General Assembly resolutions 40/32 of29 
November 1985 and 40/146 of 13 December 1985 
159 See for example: Principles on the Effective Investigation and Documentation of Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, adopted by General Assembly resolution 55/89 Annex, 4 
December 2000; Guidelines on the Role of Prosecutors, ibid; and Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for 
Vctims of Crimes and Abuse of Power, adopted by the General Assemble Resolution 40/34 of29 November 
1985. 
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of ethnic cleaning is charged with multiple murders instead of genocide. In this 
example, would the ICC be able to infer unwillingness to prosecute genuinely - citing 
State intent to protect an accused from the fullest extent of his or her criminal 
responsibility on the grounds that domestic authorities are under prosecuting the 
offender?160 Although this was not included in the Informal Expert Paper, it is submitted 
that the lack of parallel legal characterisation could be taken as an indicia of a State's 
unwillingness. In such a determination, the issue lies in the genuineness of the intent or 
the lack thereof, of the State concerned to investigate or prosecute a particular case. 
Such unwillingness or shielding may well take the form of not charging the person 
responsible for the offence with the appropriate crime suited to his or her conduct. 
It has been said that under prosecution in itself cannot make a case admissible. 161 Such a 
statement has merits, considering the possibility that under prosecution may be the most 
practicable procedure at the time -the possibility of plea bargaining162 -·or because the 
domestic legal system does not have any law criminalising international crimes. The 
Rome Statute did not include an express provision on State obligations to legislate the 
necessary domestic laws incorporating article 5 crimes in its penal code. In the absence 
of an enabling national legislation, the Prosecutor can revert to or cite inaction as a 
ground for admissibility. Nevertheless, if the absence of an implementing law can be 
linked to the claim that the State is acting in bad faith in ensuring impunity for 
perpetrators, then the Court will be justified to draw an inference of unwillingness. 
More so, if the State in question has laws criminalising international crimes, there seems 
to be no reason or cause which can hinder the Prosecutor to argue for unwillingness of 
the State concerned. 
It is likewise possible that the lack of parallel legal characterisation could take the form 
of over prosecution, e.g. charging genocide in relation to a specific conduct, instead of 
war crimes, to raise evidentiary burden required to get a conviction. In this instance, 
legal action can be carried out to ensure that a particular defendant will not be 
160 Werle, Principles of International Criminal Law (Cambridge University Press 2005). 
161 See Broomhall, A Checklist for Implementation, op. cit. note 59, at p. 149. 
162 An offender may likely plea guilty on lesser offence of murder or rape than more serious genocide or war 
crimes. 
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convicted, as the substantive and evidentiary burdens will be greater and as such, 
insurmountable. Though such scenario may seem unlikely, if over prosecution can be 
proven as a way of protecting a person, for instance, by showing similar practices in the 
past, then an inference of unwillingness may also appear reasonable. 
1.2. Evidence From Third Parties 
There is always a possibility to obtain evidence of unwillingness from an insider or one who 
works for the government. Whenever corroborated by other findings, a statement from a 
national official claiming that the proceeding is a sham could be taken as strong evidence in 
establishing unwillingness on the part of a State to conduct a bona fide proceeding. Moreover, 
institutions which are part of the State such as human rights entities or truth commissions, 
may also be a source of evidence for the Prosecutor. A human rights case decided by the 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) can be taken as an illustrative 
example in this regard. In Ignacio Ellacuria, S.J,y Otros vEl Sa/vado/63, the report of the El 
Salvadorian Truth Commission became the basis to which the IACHR made its decision. In 
that case, it was alleged that the domestic proceeding carried out by the State authority served 
to obviate the criminal sanctions which should have been bestowed upon the intellectual 
authors of the massacre. In its report, the Truth Commission held that there is sufficient 
evidence to conclude that the relevant authority had deliberately taken steps to conceal the 
truth. Before relying upon the conclusion of the report, the IACHR initially assessed the 
credibility of the Truth Commission, its methodology in conducting investigation and the 
circumstances upon which the said commission was established. The IACHR noted the role 
of the UN Secretary General in electing the members of the Truth Commission with the 
advice and consent of the State concerned. The IACHR considered that the 'impartiality, 
soundness and good faith of the Truth Commission are not open to question.' 164 In deciding, 
inter alia, that the State had breached its human rights obligation to warrant the right to 
judicial guarantees and effective judicial protection, 165 the IACHR accepted the Truth 
Commission's findings that the domestic authorities had staged a sham proceeding. 
163 [1999] Case 10.488, Report No. 136/99 OENSer.LN/11.106 Doc. 3 rev. at 608. 
164 Ibid, at para. 75. 
165 Article 8{1) and 25 ofthe American Convention on Human Rights. El Salvador, as a State party, has the 
obligation to guarantee the rights enshrined under the said convention. 
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Coming now to the ICC, if the Prosecutor or the Pre-Trial Chamber is presented with similar 
evidence from an institution that is part of the State in question, there will be a greater 
probability that the Court will also subject the source to a similar assessment as regard its 
trustworthiness. It needs to be underscored, however, that the above cited example, the case of 
Ignacio Ellacuria is of a peculiar circumstance. In view of the role played by the UN 
Secretary General of the UN, it became relatively easier for the IACHR to place confidence in 
the Truth Commission's credibility and consequently, its conclusions. However, without the 
involvement of a reliable organisation such as the UN, the task of determining the reliability 
of a source, which is part of the State being examined, could be difficult. The political factor, 
for example, can pose a challenge. In any State as there is always an opposition ready to 
undermine the credibility of any current or incumbent government. One might ask, how an 
outside party, the Prosecutor or the Court, could judge whether information obtained from 
within the State is not tainted with internal politics? 
Information from sources other than an institution of the State or individuals working for the 
government could be used to establish unwillingness or to corroborate other evidence. UN 
reports, such as those prepared by special country rapportoires, where they may be relevant, 
could be of significant value for the Prosecutor's work. Nonetheless, the Prosecutor or the 
ICC still has to ensure whether in a given UN report, a State's action had been judged in 
accordance to human rights standards. The nature, author and the purpose of the UN reports 
must be taken into consideration before the same can unequivocally be of substantive use for 
the Court. For example, a report by the Human Rights Committee suggesting that a legal 
action taken at the national level lacks transparency, cannot by itself instantaneously support a 
claim of lack of genuineness of a proceeding. The burden for the Prosecutor goes further than 
simply determining whether the domestic proceeding concerned had breached the minimum 
international standards of human rights. The crux of his or her investigation must examine 
whether, indeed, there exists an attempt to manipulate domestic proceedings to preclude a 
conviction .. 
There are, nevertheless, UN reports prepared solely for inquiry such as a confirmation 
whether genocide or other international crimes are being committed in a given State or region. 
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A perfect example would be that of the Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on 
Darfur to the UN Secretary-General. 166 With its mandate to investigate alleged violations of 
humanitarian and human rights law, identify the perpetrators and suggest the desired means 
to ensure accountability of those who are responsible of the breaches, the Commission of 
Inquiry on Darfur held that it is of 'the opinion that the Sudanese courts are unable and 
unwilling to prosecute and try the alleged offenders.' 167 Before reaching its conclusions, the 
Commission examined the actions taken by the State authority in response to the reported 
violations of international humanitarian and human rights law. The Commission found that 
the steps taken by the domestic authority 'constitute more a window-dressing operation than a 
real and effective response to large scale criminality' and that its judicial system showed lack 
of willingness to prosecute and punish effectively those who are criminally responsible. 168 
Based on the recommendation of the Commission on Darfur, the Security Council referred 
the situation in Darfur to the ICC Prosecutor who determined that there is sufficient basis to 
initiate a formal investigation.169 In circumstances like the one in Darfur where there is a 
'reliable' report explicitly confirming a State's unwillingness, how much credence will the 
Pre-Trial Chamber confer on such a report prepared by a UN commission in the event that an 
admissibility challenge based on complementarity is raised? Considering that the burden on 
admissibility would likely be 'on the balance of probability' as opposed to 'beyond 
reasonable doubt,' it could be argued that such a UN commission's report, once the Pre-Trial 
Chamber is satisfied as to its impartiality, would be heavily relied upon; but whether it would 
suffice on its own merit remains to be a question awaiting for the Court's decision. 
For their part, NGOs are expected to be a likely valuable source of information for the 
Prosecutor in investigating bona fide proceedings. In more recent years, NGOs have played 
an increasingly instrumental role in monitoring serious violations of humanitarian and human 
rights law, as well as providing relevant information and evidence. In this regard, NGOs may 
also provide crucial assistance to the Prosecutor. Moreover, many established organisations 
have expertise which the Prosecutor could benefit from, especially in relation to specific 
domestic legal orders of States. Nevertheless, as to how a NGO's report pointing to sham 
166 Available at <www.un.org/News/dh/sudan/com inq darfur.pdt>. 
167 Ibid, at p. 144. 
168 Ibid, p. 144 and ll5. 
169 SC Resolution, UN Doc. SIRES/1593 (2005). 
61 
proceedings will be taken by the Court would de.(Jend on the nature of the report and whether, 
in the Court's view, an organisation is reliable enough. 170 
1.3. National & International Law Discrepancies 
As said above, there are various indicia from which the Court may draw an inference of 
unwillingness. It is, nevertheless, interesting to raise the question about a given domestic legal 
system's ineffectiveness and failure to conform to principles of due process in light of the 
seemingly irreconcilable discre.(Jancy between national and international law. Would the ICC 
unhesitatingly be ready to accept a claim of unwillingness on the grounds that the judicial 
body is operating in such a manner that is inconsistent to the principles of due process as 
recognised under international law? For instance, whilst only a few State parties have based 
their legal systems on Islamic law,171 the distinctive structure oftheir criminal and .(Jrocedural 
laws .(Jrovides an excellent example of this discrepancy. 
Shariah or Islamic law is unique in comparison to western legal systems as its substantive 
sources are a religious book, the Quar 'an, and Sunna or Tradition, which includes the Prophet 
Mohammed's lifetime actions and sayings. 172 There could be several forms of constitutional 
arrangements to which Shariah becomes the State rule. The most extreme is supreme 
sovereignty where God is constitutionally recognised as the supreme ruler over sovereignty 
and State. Sudan exemplifies this kind of constitutional arrangement173 which 'imposes an 
excessively rigid form of Shariah on the people with little, if any, regard for due process or 
the basic rights of citizens.' 174 One must keep in mind that the ultimate purpose of Shariah is 
towards the realisation of God's will and obedience to God's commandments. A rigid 
170 HYJ>othetically, how would the ICC treat the statement of the Human Rights Watch (HRW) in "Justice Denied 
for East Timor: Indonesia's Sham Prosecutions, the Need to Strengthen the Trial Process in East Timor, and the 
Imperative of UN Action," 20 Dec 2002, (available at <www.hrw.org>), where the HRW unequivoca11y claimed 
that the Indonesian government conducted sham proceedings. 
171 Lebanon and Sudan, for example. 
172 For discussions on Islamic Law and Norms of International Law, see among others: Baderin, International 
Human Rights & Islamic Law (Oxford University Press, 2003); Abdel Haleem, Omar Sherif, Daniels (eds), 
Criminal Justice in Islam: Judicial Procedure in the Sharia (LB. Tauris, 2003); and Malekian, The Concept of 
Islamic International Criminal Law: A Comparative Study (Graham & Trotman Limited 1994). -
173 Article 4 ofthe Constitution ofthe Republic of Sudan. 
174 Roach, Arab States and the Role of Islam in the International Criminal Court [2005] 53 Political Studies 143, 
at p. 147. 
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interpretation of the purpose of Shariah may be used, in theory, as a justification for 
bypassing principles of due process or human rights. It is to be emphasised, nevertheless, that 
the Shariah shares many commonalities with the norms of due process and human rights and 
that Islamic law does acknowledge such principles. 175 However, as a source of law 
guaranteeing due process, there seems to be a case to claim that Shariah is ambiguous. 
Shariah only purports, although rather compellingly, substantive justice and leaves procedural 
matters, including regard for due process, subject to the interpretation of State authorities. 
Such a legal structure will not posit any problem even if principles of due process are not 
given constitutional ranking, as long as they are respected and put to practice. 176 However, an 
overriding concern from such States is the possibility that Western standards of due process 
will be used to judge their domestic systems. Their concern is not without any basis as 
principles of due process and fairness of trials developed from Anglo-American legal 
traditions. 177 Thus, a State that has a legal system which, in many respects, fundamentally 
differs from most of western States' legal structures, may be prejudiced by such a disparity 
between its national criminal system and the principles of due process, as recognised by 
international law and mainly founded upon Western tradition. 178 In connection to Islamic law, 
such a concern could be further aggravated by negative views, especially in the interpretation 
of the Shariah vis-a-vis internationallaw. 179 Albeit easier said than done, the Prosecutor or 
the Pre-Trial Chamber, in ascertaining possible admissibility, must be careful not to be seen 
as imposing the so-called Western standards and instead, put more emphasis on the task of 
assessing the genuineness of an investigation or prosecution. 
175 Baderin, op. cit. note 172, at p. 96. 
176 In Tabandeh, S., A Muslim Commentary on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Goulding 1970), at 
p. 28, the author claimed that the 6 articles on fair trail and due process under the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights 'conform fully to Islamic law.' · 
:::See Novak, M., Commentary on the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (N. P. Engel 1993), at p. 237. 
See Summers, op. cit. note I, at p. 76. 
179 It was cited in Baderin, op. cit., at p. 3, for example, that in relation to international human rights law, there is 
a general view that 'Islamic law is incompatible with the ideals of international human rights and that human 
rights are not realisable within the dispensation of Islamic law.' Although it was in relation to international 
human rights, at the international level the standards of human rights and of due process of criminal law 
intertwine in many respects. See also Strawson, J., 'Encountering Islamic Law', University of East London Law 
Department Research Publication Series, No. I, at p. I: 'Islamic law is represented within the Anglo-American 
scholarship as an essentially defective legal system.' 
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Other examples of legal systems which are different from the Western legal tradition are old 
customary methods of administering justice. For instance, the Rwandan Gacaca, which was 
also cited above, is modelled from its ancient system of resolving conflicts. The Gacaca 
tribunals are vested with wide ranging powers, both that of the normal Rwandan courts and 
the domestic prosecutor. However, the Gacaca system may have failed to conform to the 
international law standards of due process. The prosecutor, for example, is not independent 
from the judge and that, contrary to article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR), defendants in Gacaca tribunals are not provided with equal legal 
powers as the prosecutor. Judges in the Gacaca courts are not professionals but elected 
individuals who had undergone informal legal training and adjudged to be of sound moral 
stature. The independence and impartiality of Gacaca tribunals were questioned, 'since nearly 
all of the elected individuals were involved in the events of the genocide to some degree.' 180 
As such, judges and witnesses may likely have personal interests in a case beyond 
determining the guilt or innocence of a defendant. 181 With the lack of procedural rules, many 
defendants may be punished for a serious crime they have not committed or may be acquitted 
despite their guilt. If such a system goes under the admissibility test of the Court, it could 
easily conclude that it does not conform to the 'principle of due process recognised by 
international law.' The ultimate decisive factor, nonetheless, even if such system may fall 
short of the norms of international law is whether an intent to shield a perpetrator was present. 
1. 4. Unwillingness & States' Rules on Evidence 
As discussed above, an inference of unwilling may be drawn from a finding of an institutional 
deficiency in a legal system. However, in cases where an aspect of a legal system seems 
overly lenient and poses risks of impunity but only to a certain extent, that is, it does not 
amount to a sufficient ground to adjudge an institutional deficiency or a procedural 
irregularity. In this instance, the crucial point is: in the absence of bad faith in the State 
concerned, would the Prosecutor be willing to review such aspect of the domestic criminal 
justice system to show hesitation on the part of the State to conduct a genuine investigation or 
prosecution. For example, States' rules on criminal evidence do vary from one jurisdiction to 
18
° Corey & Joireman, op. cit. note I 16, at p. 85. 
181 Ibid . 
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the other. In certain States, the rules governing evidence might be rigid, making it potentially 
easier for the Prosecutor to argue for an irregularity in the procedure but then again, in other 
legal systems, the rules of evidence are lax. However, the leniency in the latter system only 
reaches a point where imperfections, whilst palpable, do not constitute an outright 
institutional deficiency nor a procedural irregularity. It is interesting to note that, if and when 
the Prosecutor is confronted by such a situation, would he bring about an unwillingness claim 
on the basis that State authorities appear to have abused their system, within its wide legal 
scope, particularly its rules on criminal evidence, in order to ensure acq~ittal of the accused 
from any criminal sanction. Will the Court be able to establish unwillingness on the grounds 
that a State's domestic law on evidence are 'too lax and generous in allowing the exclusion of 
evidence?' 182 If significant evidence had been excluded under national law due to the leniency 
of its rules of evidence, albeit within its domestic legal terms, will the Prosecutor be allowed 
to argue that in excluding those evidence, the State in question is unwilling to prosecute? 
Although there is no concrete guideline or limit as to what evidence can be used to prove 
unwillingness, in this regard it might be difficult to draw the line indicating whether the ICC 
is superseding a State's discretion over its chosen rules on evidence, or where it is acting 
within its mandate to intervene over national jurisdiction whose domestic proceedings were 
found not to be genuine. The issue becomes more problematic if exclusion of evidence is 
justified under the mantle of allegedly upholding human rights and principles of due process, 
which is not an uncommon scenario. Without an explicit prohibition under the Rome Statute, 
it seems possible for the Prosecutor to argue that a State's liberal rules of evidence redound to 
forestalling any criminal conviction. In allowing such an argument, the Court might 
inadvertently, and arguably beyond its authority, be setting or raising international standards 
on rules and evidence. 
1.5. Violation ofthe Rights of an Accused 
Of sham proceedings and violation of the rights of an accused, an argument that a violation of 
an accused's rights could be used as indicia of a State's unwillingness to conduct a bona fide 
proceeding is very unlikely to yield any merit. The mandate of the Court to assume 
182 Bohlander, Evidence before the International Criminal Court- Basic Principles [2005] 4 ERA 543, at p. 
552-3. 
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jurisdiction over domestic cases is linked to a purpose of ending impunity and not the 
protection of the rights of an accused. 183 Furthermore, the travaux preparatoires would attest 
to the claim that the Court is not to serve as an appellant court, nor as a human rights court of 
appeals. It must be pointed out, however, that shielding a person from his or her criminal 
responsibilities may take the form of accusing another person whose rights, e.g. a 
presumption of innocence, may have to be violated in the process. The ensuing wrongful 
verdict for the falsely accused shall warrant the real perpetrator's escape from conviction with 
certainty. Although this sort of scenario would classify as a sham proceeding, it may be more 
reasonable and expedient to argue for its admissibility on the grounds that a State had 
remained inactive, and not base on article 17(2)(a). As discussed previously, such a case 
could be admissible in light of the decision in Lubanga Dyilo184, that is, on the basis that a 
national proceeding had not encompassed both the conduct and the person; in the instant case, 
the person was left out. 
1.6.Conclusion 
Without any precedence, it may be difficult to speculate the full range of possible 
interpretations relative to article 17(2)(a) with some degree of certainty, as well as the 
relevance of the various indicia and their applicability in actual cases. The Rome Statute 
provides very little guidance in construing which acts constitute shielding a perpetrator from 
criminal sanctions. The evidence that can be used to establish that a State intends to protect a 
person from criminal accountability is vast; however, it cannot be taken as an indication that 
the task of proving such allegations is easy and straightforward. The extent or degree of 
difficulty cannot as yet be envisaged, considering that a subjective examination of the State 
authorities' intentions must be equivocally identified and supported by a preponderance of 
evidence, not to mention the resulting aggravation once international politics will come into 
play. In their defence, States charged of acting in bad faith may well protest that the 
Prosecutor or the Pre-Trial Chamber had been biased towards their legal systems or that the 
Court had over stepped its mandate by passing judgments on their judicial systems. 
183 See the Preamble of the Rome Statute. 
184 Ibid 
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2. Article 17(2)(b): Unjustified Delay 
This section concerns the second criterion to establish unwillingness as contained in article 
17(2)(b ), that is, a State is unwilling to carry out a genuine proceeding where there is an 
unjustified delay and which, under these circumstances, causes a marked deviation from an 
intent to carry out a bona fide investigation or prosecution. From the foregoing statement, two 
requirements have to be met in order to fulfil this criterion. 185 First, it must be established that 
there is an unjustified delay. Second, it must be proven that such a delay is inconsistent with 
an intent to carry out a genuine proceeding. The existence of a de facto delay, by and of itself, 
cannot be regarded as a sufficient basis to conclude unwillingness; it must be clearly 
identified that delays were resorted to, prior and during the conduct of proceedings, with the 
end in view of aiding or ensuring the acquittal of an accused! 86 An all-too-frequent 
occurrence, for example, of national courts being overburdened with numerous cases causing 
delays, likewise for developed States, would not automatically render a State as unwilling. 
There must be a linked between the unjustified delay and the intention of the State concerned 
not to carry out a genuine proceeding. 
In satisfying article 17(2)(b ), the first question to ask is what constitutes an unjustified delay. 
The Rome Statute did not provide any clear guideline in this regard. Judges are thus, left to 
construe what is exactly meant by 'unjustified delay.' It must be recalled that during the 
drafting period, the language used was 'undue' delay. The term was later changed to 
'unjustified' delay because many State delegations argued that the threshold to satisfy undue 
delay is not high enough. Unjustified delay as a criterion for admissibility for an international 
court is a legal innovation which is technically comparable to none. In contrast, undue delay 
had already been established in the context of international human rights and defined in a 
number of decisions by regional human rights courts such as the European Court of Human 
Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. Although the standards of unjustified 
delay is higher than undue delay, prior decisions rendered by the said human rights courts 
may provide the ICC, albeit to a limited extent, a basis to ascertain delays in a proceeding. In 
cursory looking at ECtHR and IACtHR decisions pertaining to undue delay, it has to be 
185 Olasolo, op. cit. note 14. 
186 s d" . . "b"d 151 ee ISCUSSIOO 10 I I ., p. . 
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mentioned that both regional courts only covered the period of trial and did not include the 
investigative or pre-trial phase. 
2.1. De Facto Delay 
In determining whether there is an undue delay under article 6 of the European Convention on 
Human Right, the ECtHR established that a proceeding will be examined in light of the 
circumstances of a case and having regard to the complexity of the facts and the conduct of 
both the applicant and the national authority. 187 As with the complexity of the facts of a case, 
the ECtHR, in Karakaya v. France, weighed a case's complexity against the availability, or 
the lack thereof, of information necessary for a domestic court to render a judgment. With 
regards to the conduct of the applicant and the competent authority, the European court 
assesses whether an applicant or a State authority had caused or contributed to a de facto 
delay and if proven to be so, the extent of such a contribution. The IACtHR, in applying 
article 8(1) of the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights which is 'equivalent in 
principle to article 6 of the European Convention,' invoked the formula established by the 
ECtHR in determining whether an undue delay had, indeed, taken place. 188 The IACtHR, 
however, went further and determined an approximate time; it held that a delay of 5 years, 
commencing from when an order had been made to initiate a proceeding, is deemed excessive 
and beyond what is reasonable. 189 
In relation to the ICC, the Court may consider the formula adopted by the ECtHR whilst 
keeping mind that proceedings in the ECtHR are different from the ICC's. The conduct of the 
applicant in the context of international human rights would be the conduct of the defendant 
in the ICC criminal proceedings. Moreover, if the Court will apply the ECtHR ruling, it is to 
be cited that a defendant in criminal proceedings may internationally delay his or her 
litigation. In light of this common practice, the conduct of a State authority will become even 
more crucial. As such, a State will also be examined whether it had, of its own doing, unduly 
187 See, inter alia, ECtHR decisions: Union Aliment aria Sanders S.A. v Spain [ 1989] 11681/85 ECHR, at para. 
31; Zimmermann and Steiner [1983] Series A no. 66, at para. 24; Capuano v Italy [1987] 9381/81 ECHR 10, at 
Rara.23; Karakaya v France [1994] 22800/93 ECHR 25, at para. 30. 
88 IACtHR decision in Genie Lacayo case, para 77. 
189 IACtHR decision in Las Palmeras para. 38. 
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delayed a proceeding or had unreasonably let a defendant abused the system who used 
delaying tactics. 
In attempting to appreciate what 'unjustified' delay mean, the ECtHR's Case of Union 
Alimentaria Sanders S.A. v Spain190, may provide some help. In that case, the State authority 
affirmed that the uncommonly heavy workload of the domestic court concerned due to the 
increase of cases filed had resulted in a backlog of cases at a relevant time. The government 
further said that the 'increase had followed on Spain's return to democracy and was due to the 
establishment of new judicial safeguard systems, an overhaul of legislation and a tendency to 
have greater recourse to the courts.' 191 The European court, whilst acknowledging the 
attendant difficulties the State was faced with, during the restoration to democracy, decided 
that the length of the proceeding in question was excessive and unreasonable. It held: 'the 
undeniable difficulties encountered in Spain could not deprive the applicant company of its 
right to have its case heard within a 'reasonable time.' 192 The case relates to a right of a legal 
entity to a fair trial within reasonable time; a right that could not be undermined easily. 193 In 
Sanders, that right was assumed prevalent over the State's justification as to why a delay had 
occurred. However, coming now to cases before the ICC, the Court's fundamental concern is 
not to uphold such a right and that the threshold is 'unjustified' delay. That being the premise, 
it is interesting to ask whether a similar justification by a State, one that appears as valid and 
compelling as that in Sanders, would actually satisfy the requirement of article 17(2)(b ). 
As with determining an approximate time, it seems unlikely that the ICC would follow the 
IACtHR's example of setting temporal limits to serve as basis in determining whether a 
proceeding is within reasonable time. The nature and seriousness of the crimes under the 
jurisdiction ofthe Court is a substantial factor. It may, out of necessity, entail a longer period 
of trial and hence, turn out unwise to set a specific time limit. 194 The ECtHR in a relatively 
old case, which took 11 years to decide concerning war crimes prosecution committed during 
190 Sanders v Spain, op. cit note 156. 
191 Ibid, at para. 37. 
192 Ibid, at para. 42. 
193 See for example Mutatis Mutandis, the Martins Moreira Judgment, Series A no. 143, p. 19 para 54 and 
Sanders, ibid at para 40: 'the fact that [ ... ] backlog situations have become commonplace does not, in the 
[ECtHR's] view, justify excessive length ofproceedings. 
194 See below, the case Kovacevic [1998] Appeals Chamber Decision Stating Reasons for Appeals Chamber's 
Order of29th of May 1998 (Separate Opinion of Judge Shahabudden) July 2, 1998 at 4-5. 
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the Second World War, commented that 'the exceptional character of criminal proceedings 
involving war crimes [ ... ] renders [ ... ] inapplicable the principles developed in case-law 
[relating to the right to a trial without undue delay] of the Commission and the Court of 
Human Rights.' 195 In this regard, a State prosecuting one or more of article 5 crimes could 
follow on ECtHR's commentary and argue that the serious nature of a case results to the 
inevitable need for a longer period of time. If this argument will be given significant merit, a 
justification on the grounds of the seriousness of a case would appear to be automatically 
available for States, given that the Court's jurisdiction only involves serious crimes of 
international concern. 
Regarding the trial period, the ICC has some sort of a benchmark in determining whether 
there is a delay, even though human rights' undue delay is essentially different from ICC's 
unjustified delay. Taking the pre-trial phase into account, i.e. examining if a de facto delay 
occurred during the period of investigation, the Court is faced with the question of which 
standard will a domestic proceeding be measured apropos to the possible occurrence of a 
delay. A reference to the common practice of States may bring no considerable assistance. 
First, State practices concerning criminal investigation enormously vary from one jurisdiction 
to the other. 196 Second, States do have substantial control over the facts and figures 
concerning the number of domestic cases and the average period it takes to adjudicate. There 
could be a risk when a State which is reluctant to bestow a case before the ICC, would 
conceal or even concoct numbers and figures to refute a claim of delays in its proceeding. In 
seeking guidance from the ad hoc Tribunals, an ICTY judge uttered that 'the peculiarities and 
difficulties of unearthing and assembling material for war crimes prosecutions' must be taken 
into account. 197 He then said: 'the resulting need for reasonable judicial flexibility is 
apparent.' 198 The latter conclusion only brings to the fore the inevitability of delays due to the 
gravity or complexities of cases. Whilst unlikely to be of significant help to the ICC in 
determining whether there is an unjustified delay, it must be noted that the context of the 
judge's statement was in the application of the principle of an accused's right to a trial 
without undue delay. Owing to its unique features, it seems that the ICC will have to establish 
195 X v Federal Republic of Germany [1 976] Application No. 6946/75/1976, at p. 115-16. 
196 See Delrnas-Marty & Spencer (eds.), op. cit. note 155. 
197 See the case of Kovacevic, op. cit. note 194. 
198 Ibid 
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its own general principles which can be applied to different judicial systems in assessing 
whether a State had delayed pre-trial proceedings. 
2.2. Inconsistency with an Intent to Investigate & Prosecute Genuinely 
The second question pertaining to article 17(2)(b) relates to whether an unjustified delay is 
'linked to the intent of the State' to carry out an investigation or prosecution in good faith. 199 
To establish unwillingness, it has to be proven that the delay is, in the circumstances, 
'inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice. ' 200 The wording of article 
17(2)(b) implies that a State, in initiating a proceeding, is presumed acting with a bona fide 
intention to investigate or prosecute. A State could therefore, be held unwilling, under the said 
subsection, if there is a proven unjustified delay and that such a delay is linked and effectively 
contradicts the presumed bona fide intent of that State. In linking the connection of the 
unjustified delay to the inconsistency of intending to carry out a proceeding genuinely, would 
it suffice to argue that a State prolonging a proceeding without good reason or justification 
means that it is unwilling? If the test is purely objective, one could easily claim that any 
unjustified delay is not in line with an intent to take legal action and thus, automatically, bring 
into play the second condition. However, the second requirement entails a subjective 
examination; the terms of the subsection insinuate that the unjustified delay must be 
indicative of a State's unwillingness or a lack of intent to investigate or prosecute genuinely. 
Therein lies the attendant challenges in meeting these requirements. 
3. Article 17(2)(c): Lack of Impartiality or Independence 
The third and last of the exhaustive list of criteria to which unwillingness can be established 
as a ground for admissibility is the lack of impartiality or independence of domestic courts. 
As with unjustified delay, article 17(2)(c) requires that th(f Court must fulfil two conditions: 
( i) that the domestic court concerned had not been impartial or independent in conducting a 
proceeding; and (ii) that its partiality or lack of independence is 'inconsistent with an intent' 
199 See Holmes, 'The Principle of Complementarity,' op. cit. note 18, at p. 50. 
200 Article 17(2)(b) of the Rome Statute. 
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to carry out a bona fide investigation or prosecution. To a certain extent, this criterion seems 
to replicate that of article 17(2)(a) which pertains to shielding a perpetrator from criminal 
responsibility.201 During the drafting of the Statute, several delegates were concerned with the 
difficulty in proving that a State intended to conduct a sham proceeding. It was pointed out 
that there may be common scenarios in which a State or a judicial institution as a whole 
cannot be regarded as staging a sham proceeding but that, certain powerful and influential 
individuals interfere with the investigation or trial to unjustly increase the possibility of an 
acquittal. As the travaux preparatoires surrounding article 17(2)( c) indicate concerning such 
a scenario, there may be a case to argue that the relevant subsection can only be construed 
within in that limited scope. 202 
3.1. De Facto Lack of Impartiality or Independence 
In establishing whether there had been a de facto lack of impartiality or independence, the 
Prosecutor may tum to some of the indicia discussed above relating to article 17(2)(a). 
Specifically, the Prosecutor could argue procedural irregularities and institutional deficiency 
in relation to politicians' capacity to influence the judicial body, on one hand, and inadequacy 
of action to establish a lack of impartiality or independence, on the other. In making a 
determination as to whether there had been a lack of impartiality or independence, the Court 
could seek some light from human rights cases decided by the ECtHR and IACtHR. 
Examples of cases, inter alia, to which the ICC may refer include: Bahamonde v Equatorial 
Guinea,203 Coyne v U.K.,204 and Villagran Morales, et al.205 
The ECtHR held that the existence or lack thereof of impartiality 'for the purposes of article 
6(1) ofthe ECHR' is to be determined 'by a subjective test, that is on the basis of the personal 
conviction of a particular judge in a given case, and also by an objective test, that is 
ascertaining whether the judge offered guarantees sufficient to exclude any legitimate doubt' 
201 See discussion in Holmes, 'The Principle of Complementarity,' op. cit. note 18, p. 50-l. 
202 See Holmes, ibid, and Olasolo, op. cit. note 14, at p. 152. 
203 UN Human Rights Committee, 20 Oct. 1993. 
204 ECHR, 24 Sept. 1997. 
205 IACtHR, 19 Nov. 1999. 
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as pertaining to the impartiality of the judicial procedure concerned?06 The subjective test 
would obviously be of significance to the ICC. In determining impartiality, the Court could 
hold that a proceeding had not been conducted impartially where the acting judge concerned 
had personal interest in acquitting or in not giving the perpetrator a meaningful conviction. 
As regards the objective test, however, the difference between the human rights court and the 
ICC must, once again, be emphasised. According to the ECtHR, the decisive factor for the 
objective test is whether or not an applicant's fear that there was impartiality in the 
proceeding was 'objectively justified. ' 207 Such a threshold may be insufficient for the ICC. 
The ECtHR is focused on whether a national court had fulfilled its minimum obligation to 
provide an impartial court, that is, in line with a person's right to be heard before an impartial 
and independent court.208 The ICC is not essentially concerned of such duty of domestic 
courts or the right of an individual. It is not to ascertain whether that right had been 
guaranteed, rather the ICC is to determine whether a national judge, investigator or any other 
person that could be involved in the proceeding had intentionally intervened in the procedure 
for the purpose of warranting acquittal or no prosecution. Once proven that an individual 
manipulated the conduct of a proceeding, the Court is to decide, based on the facts and 
characteristics of each case, whether the interference is significant enough to conclude that the 
proceeding had not been carried out in an impartial or independent manner. 
3.2. Inconsistency with an Intent to Investigate or Prosecute Genuinely 
The second condition which is similar to article 17(2)(b) requires that the lack of impartiality 
or independence must be inconsistent with an intent to carry out a genuine proceeding. It is 
submitted that in order to satisfy this second requirement, the Prosecutor must prove that the 
lack of impartiality or independence in a proceeding favours a suspect or an accused. In other 
words, due to the lack of impartiality or independence, such individual would unlikely face a 
206 See, among other authorities, De Cubber v Belgium (Application no. 9186/80) [1984] ECHR 14, Case of 
Hauschildt v Denmark (Application no. I 0486/83) [I 989] ECHR, Case of Castillo Algar v Spain 
(79/1997/863/1074) [1998) ECHR. 
207 See Case of Algar, ibid, at para. 45 and Case of Hauschildt, ibid, at p. 21, para 48. 
208 In the judgment in Hauschildt, ibid, it was said that 'what is at stake is the confidence which the courts in a 
democratic society must inspire in the public and above, as far as criminal proceedings are concerned, in the 
accused.' 
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prosecution or would in all probability, be acquitted. Any de facto lack of impartiality or 
independence, albeit could possibly be claimed as inconsistent with an intent to carry out a 
genuine proceeding, cannot satisfy the second requirement on its own. It was held, for 
instance, by the Human Rights Committee that 'a situation where the functions and 
competence of the judiciary and the executive are not clearly distinguishable [ ... ] is 
incompatible with the notion of an independent and impartial tribunal. ' 209 If such a situation is 
sufficient to satisfy the second requirement, not only would the gate of admissibility open 
wider, but it would also appear incompatible with the constraint complementary role of the 
ICC under the terms of article 17(2), which is to investigate or prosecute perpetrators only 
when States are not willing. 
3.3. Passing Judgments on States' Legal System 
State delegates during the negotiation also expressed their concern that the ICC, in the course 
of an unwillingness determination, might pass judgments on States' national laws and legal 
systems. It was underscored that the mandate of the Court to admit cases has to be based on 
procedural grounds.210 The ICC has no authority to criticise substantive laws of States. 
However, in assessing whether a particular proceeding lacks impartiality or independence, an 
examination of the domestic criminal systems may be necessary; in this regard, the concern of 
delegates may seem more legitimate. Whilst article 17(2)(a) would overwhelm any such 
concern as it requires a specific intent and concomitantly sound evidence of shielding the 
accused, the impartiality or independence criterion demands, arguably at least, a lesser 
condition. To establish that a proceeding was conducted in a manner that raises doubts as to 
its impartiality or independence entails reviewing the relevant law applied. Inevitably in some 
cases, the demarcation line appears to be very fme between, on one hand, the claim that there 
had been impartiality in the application of a specific law and on the other hand, the counter 
perception of states that the Court is merely criticising domestic law. Indeed, there are 
instances to which national laws appear unfair and could lead to impartiality. Nonetheless, the 
209 The Human Rights Committee, Bahamonde case. 
210 See the Informal Expert Paper, op. cit. note 38. 
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Court as a reviewing body must proceed with caution, least it be viewed as mocking States' 
laws and legal systems. 211 
The point put forth could become clearer if human rights cases are taken as examples. In 
Hauschi/td v Denmark, the ECtHR appears to have taken prudence and specified that its 'task 
is not to review the relevant law and practice in abstracto, but to determine whether the 
manner in which they were applied to[ ... ] gave rise' to a doubt as to the impartiality of the 
court in question.212 In the same case, it was held that there had been a violation of article 6(1) 
ECHR, the right to be heard before an impartial and independent court, as the Danish judge 
who made pre-trial decisions on the applicant also presided over the trial. Nevertheless, the 
ECtHR judgment was not delivered without emphasising that the 'mere fact that a trial judge 
[ ... ], in a system like the Danish, has also made pre-trial decisions in the case [ ... ] cannot be 
held as in itself justifying fears as to his impartiality. ' 213 The decision was then grounded on 
the special features of the case's facts in which the judge made nine pre-trial decisions on the 
applicant. Similarly, the ECtHR in Holm v Sweden214 held that the impartiality of the relevant 
national court was 'open to doubt' and the applicant's concern was 'objectively justified.' The 
case of Holm involved a jury trial where the membership of its five jurors subjected the 
impartiality of the decision to misgivings; that is, despite the fact that the jurors were elected 
'in conformity with the legal conditions for eligibility,' to which the government had 
argued.215 The ICC may encounter similar facts and arguments in the near future. Evidently as 
it shows in the examples, discretion is required and more so for the ICC, as it is to handle 
grave criminal cases that is of concern to the international community. 
211 Take for example the case Constitutional Right Project (in Respect of Akamu, Adega & Others) v Nigeria, 
African Commission on Human & Peoples' Rights, 2 Oct. 1995, in which the national law in question- The 
Robbery & Firearms (Special Provision) Decree No. 5 of I 984) - creates special tribunals composed of a judge, 
a member of the armed forces and a member of the police force and whose judgments may be confirmed or 
disallowed by the Governor. The Act clearly violates Article 7 of African Charter which requires impartiality of 
courts. As the law and its application are intertwined, bow can it be said that the application is wrong without 
implying that what was applied was erroneous, at least in this case? 
212 Ibid, at para. 45. 
213 Ibid, at para 50. 
214 Holm v Sweden [1993] 1419/88 ECHR 58, at para 33. 
215 Ibid, at para. 3 I. 
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C. Article 17(3): Inability 
Establishing inability is less complicated than proving unwillingness. The inability criterion 
involves a more objective examination. It does not require the Prosecutor to investigate into 
States' subjective intentions in initiating proceedings. Determining whether a judicial system 
had collapsed or if national authorities had obtained the suspect or evidence are fact-driven 
enquiries. An issue, nevertheless, may still arise if a State, contrary to the Prosecutor's 
fmdings, believes that it is able to carry out a proceeding genuinely. There may seem to be an 
overlap between the inability and inaction as grounds for admitting cases. A State, for 
example, may have remained inactive and unable to initiate a proceeding due to a shortage of 
financial and human resources. To distinguish whether such a case would be admissible on 
the grounds of inaction or inability depends on whether such a State had remained inactive all 
along or had initiated a proceeding, e.g. a criminal investigation, encompassing both the 
person and the conduct. If no a priori proceeding was instigated, then it is to fall under 
inaction. Otherwise, a proceeding covering both the person and the conduct would potentially 
engage the inability criterion. 
To satisfy article 17(3) two conditions must be met. First, it has to be established that there 
had been a 'total or substantial collapse or unavailability' of a State's judicial system. Second, 
due to such a collapse or unavailability, the State concerned had been 'unable to obtain the 
accused or the necessary evidence and testimony or otherwise unable to carry out its 
proceedings.' Both conditions have to be satisfied in order to conclude that a State is unable 
to carry out a genuine proceeding, for the purpose of the article 17 of the Rome Statute. It 
seems therefore, that there is a case to argue that the said subsection only covers uncommon 
and 'very exceptional' circumstances, such as those, for instance, where a State has no 
operating govemment.216 Accordingly, there has been a concern towards the strict terms of 
article 17(3) making it too difficult to establish inability.217 For example, after experiencing a 
breakout, a State's judicial justice may yet be capable of functioning. However, due to an 
outstanding large number of situations that it has to deal with, it becomes incapable, albeit not 
unwilling, to arrest a perpetrator who committed a very grave article 5 crime and unable to 
216 Olasolo, op. cit. note 14, at p. 154. 
217 See Holmes, 'The Principle of Complementarity,' op. cit. note 18. 
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obtain the necessary evidence to commence a prosecution. In that example, the strict technical 
requirement of article 17(3) that a State's judicial system must have totally or substantially 
collapsed or is unavailable would probably entail that the Court will be unable to intervene 
pertaining to such an instance. 
The first condition is 'total or substantial collapse' or 'unavailability' of the national judicial 
system concerned. What is meant by a collapse must be determined by the Court. During the 
negotiation period, the drafters had referred to situations where an international or civil armed 
conflict had caused a breakdown or collapse of the judicial system. A collapsed judicial 
system is one that is not able to function or do what it is supposed to carry out. The critical 
qualifier, which the Court must ascertain, is whether a collapse impeded the substantial 
fraction of a judicial system from operating. A mere partial collapse is not sufficient, even if it 
affects the efficiency of the whole legal system concerned?18 Potential indicia that may 
suggest a collapse of a judicial system include: 'lack of necessary personnel, judges, 
investigators [or] prosecutors; [and] lack of judicial infrastructure. ' 219 
Although both 'collapse' and 'unavailability' were not defmed under article 17(3), the former 
was accompanied by important adjectives, 'total or substantial,' whilst the latter was left for 
the judges to construe. Indeed, a judicial system that had totally or substantially collapsed is 
also unavailable, but an unavailable judicial system arguably, does not necessarily mean a 
collapsed domestic legal order. The way the subsection was worded appears to imply that the 
first condition of the said subsection does not necessitate that a collapse of a judicial system 
must have been established; that a domestic legal system being unavailable will suffice. This 
point is noteworthy because of the possibilities and the extent to which the term 
'unavailability' could be interpreted. As total or substantial collapse of a judicial system 
seems too specific, a broader reading of 'unavailability' could lead to a wider number of 
situations being potentially admissible before the ICC on the grounds of inability. 
218 During the Conference in Rome, the adjective 'partial' was substituted with 'substantial' to cater the concerns 
of several State delegations. 
219 The Informal Expert Paper, op. cit note 38, at p. 3 I. 
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A key consideration with respect to the term 'unavailability' is whether it was intended only 
to cover administrative unavailability of a judicial system. An example is when a State cannot 
continue with a proceeding because there is no court building or that there is a shortage of 
professional personnel. On the one hand, if the question is to be answered affirmatively, then 
interpreting 'unavailability' cannot be far from construing 'collapse.' A national legal system 
that cannot operate and carry out its judicial functions due to the fact that it lacks court 
buildings and has severe shortage of personnel is likely because it has collapsed. On the other 
hand, it could be maintained that 'unavailability' can be given a wider interpretation. In the 
Informal Expert Paper, it was recommended that the relevant term be read in a broader sense 
to include 'typical cases of inability. ' 220 In that light, could 'unavailability' be read broader to 
encompass instances where a domestic legal system is unable to carry out a proceeding for 
reasons other than administrative impediments? Albeit no further indication was mentioned as 
to how broad the extent of the interpretation can be allowed, the Expert Paper merely 
provided potential indicia to establish inability which suggests a wider reading of the term 
'unavailability.' 221 It stipulated that unavailability could be established where there are: 'lack 
of substantive or procedural penal legislation; lack of [judicial] access; obstructions by 
uncontrolled elements; amnesties and immunities. ' 222 
In the case of Uganda and the accused LRA leaders, for example, it would be possible to put 
forth the argument that the State's judicial system is unavailable because 'the presence of the 
accused in a neighbouring State prevents Uganda from taking them into custody.' 223 The 
situation was admitted based on the voluntary referral of the State. However, had the 
government not referred the case before the ICC, could such an argument that the Ugandan 
authority is, under article 17(3), unable to exercise its jurisdiction, possibly succeed an 
admissibility determination? Since Uganda initiated proceedings, the admissibility of the case 
could not be regarded as inaction. No proven article 17(2) unwillingness on the part of 
Uganda was also established. Moreover, no evidence was found signifying a total or 
substantial collapse of its judicial system. One may be inclined to maintain that a broader 
220 Ibid. at p. 15, footnote 15. 
221 Ibid, at p. 31. 
222 Amnesties and immunities could potentially result to a case of inaction where the State concerned had not 
initiated any proceeding due to an amnesty or immunity. See discussion above. 
223 Akhavan, op. cit. note 53, at p. 415. 
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interpretation of 'unavailability' is reasonable to cover situations such as that in Uganda. The 
Informal Paper also suggested amnesties as indicia to argue unavailability. Amnesties would 
be relevant to article 17(3) where they had been granted after a domestic proceeding had been 
initiated, either during investigation or prosecution. Otherwise, if amnesties had prevented 
any national proceeding from commencing, then it will potentially be a case of inaction. It 
was argued that a State which is precluded from prosecuting a person because of an amnesty 
granted would amount to an unavailability of that State's judicial system.224 Furthermore, it 
could be claimed that article 17(3) was intended to have a broad scope, evidenced by the 
addition of the phrase 'or otherwise unable to carry out its proceedings' at the end of the 
subsection.225 
Another example is where a judicial system, due to an armed conflict, is overburdened with 
enormous number of cases. Could that be argued as capable of satisfying the term 
'unavailability'? One can perhaps surmise that it may be considered as an extreme or even 
far-fetch broadening of 'unavailability.' First of all, such a scenario was not considered during 
the negotiation period and second, determining whether or not a domestic legal system is 
overburdened is a matter of judgment, which it can be argued as contrary to the more 
objective essence of article 17(3). 226 It could thus, be easily asserted that the drafters had not 
intended the inability criteria to cover overburdened judicial systems.227 Nevertheless, if such 
an example cannot come under the shadow of a substantially or totally collapsed legal system 
and the overburdening does lead to a de facto impunity, can a literal reading of article 17(3) 
result to a much broader interpretation of the term 'unavailability' in order to include such a 
situation? With all these questions raised as to how 'unavailability' could be construed, 
definitive answers are yet to come, if and when, the Court is confronted with a similar 
situation. 
The second condition of article 17(3) is that a State was unable to obtain the suspect or the 
necessary evidence, or for other reasons a State was unable to carry out its proceeding. It must 
224 See O'Shea, op. cit note 101, at p. 126. 
225 See Akhayan, op. cit. note 53. 
226 See Arsanjani & Reisman, op. cit. note 56, at p. 388 and 390. 
227 See Philips, op. cit. note 48, at p. 79: ' ... the Court is not envisioned as an adjunct to a strained national 
system.' 
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be emphasised that a failure of a State authority to obtain the suspect or evidence must be due 
to a substantial or total collapse or unavailability of its judicial_ system. Mere incompetence of 
a State to gather the evidence or to arrest the accused will not therefore, satisfy the relevant 
subsection. The phrase 'or otherwise unable to carry out its proceedings' was intended to 
subsume instances where a State is still unable - despite having obtained the accused and the 
evidence. The common example given in relation to this is where there is a serious shortage 
of personnel to carry out a genuine prosecution. 228 
As earlier mentioned, the inability criterion seems to cater to only a few situations. Even if the 
term 'unavailability' is given a broader interpretation, the conditions to be met in satisfying 
the criterion, suggest that the Court is only to intervene in very exceptional cases. At least in 
relation to the inability criterion, the complementarity regime of the ICC was criticised as it 
would only affect the judicial systems of poor or developing States. 229 It was reasoned that in 
all probability, legal systems of developed nations would unlikely trigger article 17(3). 
Although it can be said that a functioning judicial system needs no intervention, the concern 
lies in the risk that the ICC might be viewed as an international institution that only imposes 
its authority over economically weak and usually, politically insignificant, States. 
228 See Holmes, The Principle of Complementarity ... ,' op. cit. note 18. 
229 Stated by Louise Arbour, see Schabas, op. cit. 28. 
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IV. ARTICLE 20(1) & (3): Ne Bis In Idem 
Article 20 concerns cases that had already been tried by a competent judicial court and the 
object of the principle of ne bis in idem is to preclude retrial or re-punishment of persons 
already judged. This principle, inscribed under several human rights conventions,230 is being 
adhered to by most national judicial systems. Its effect, nevertheless, is generally restrained 
within a single jurisdictional regime. At the international level where an international court 
and a domestic forum have concurrent jurisdiction, the rule against double jeopardy is also 
respected. The statutes of the ICC precursors, the ICTY and ICTR, provided: no person can 
be tried again by a domestic court where such person had already been adjudicated by any of 
the international tribunals; and that only under certain circumstances can either the ad hoc 
tribunals carry out a subsequent prosecution against a person tried already by a national 
court?31 Under the Statutes of the ad hoc tribunals, the general applicability of the double 
jeopardy rule is thus, subject to two exemptions. The first pertains to the conduct in which the 
defendant had been tried. This refers to situations where a national forum prosecuted an 
accused for ordinary crimes based on conducts that more appropriately, constitute an 
international crime. The second is based on the proceeding of the initial trial carried out by a 
national court. This is exemplified in situations where the legal action was done in a manner 
that cannot be regarded as impartial or independent or where the proceeding was found to be 
for the purpose of shielding a perpetrator from his or her criminal responsibility. 
In the case of the ICC, the Court likewise adheres to the principle of ne bis in idem, more so, 
it is submitted, because of the complementary nature of its jurisdiction. It had been claimed 
that the ne bis in idem principle is, 'in some respects, a corollary to the principle of 
complementarity reflected in article 17, which precludes the Court from asserting jurisdiction 
when a competent national legal system has already accepted jurisdiction, ' 232 The ICC 
follows its predecessors in providing exemptions to the said principle but the terms of article 
20 of the Rome Statute largely differs from those of the ad hoc tribunals' statutes. Under 
230 Stipulated under article 14(7) of the ICCPR, article 86 of Geneva Convention III and article 117(3) of Geneva 
Convention IV. 
231 Article 10 of the ICTY Statute and article 9 ofthe ICTR Statute. 
232 Bassiouni, op. cit. note 115, at p. 16 I. 
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article 20, the manner in which a proceeding had been conducted, where it is a mere sham or 
lacks impartiality or independence, was included as a potential ground for an exemption from 
the double jeopardy rule. It is, nonetheless, uncertain whether an initial domestic prosecution 
of a defendant for ordinary crimes based on conducts that constitute international crimes 
could also give rise to an exemption from the same rule?33 
A. Article 20(1) 
Article 20(1) prohibits subsequent prosecution by the Court of a person, already tried before 
the ICC, 'with respect to conduct which formed the basis of crimes for which the person has 
been convicted or acquitted by the Court.' Two points can be raised in this regard. First, the 
said article began with the phrase 'except as provided in this Statute.' True enough, the Rome 
Statute has provisions that arguably contradict and confine the scope of the double jeopardy 
rule. Under article 81 of the Rome Statute, an appeal was not only permissible against a 
judgment of conviction but also against an acquittal; a position which appear unacceptable 
from the point of view of common law tradition but may be normal from the civil law 
tradition?34 On the grounds of procedural error, error of fact or law, 235 an appeal against 
acquittal may be made by the Prosecutor. 236 Where the Appeals Chamber fmds that a decision 
was affected by such an error, it may 'order a new trial before a different Trial Chamber. ' 237 
More so in relation to the ground error of fact, the right of the Prosecutor to appeal against an 
acquittal may seem to undermine the ne bis in idem principle. However, where it is on the 
basis of new and significant evidence found, which 'was not available' at the time of the 
original trial, only conviction may be appealed against. 238 Second, the wording of article 20(1) 
renders a broad reading of what would be prohibited by the ne bis in idem principle in relation 
persons already acquitted by the Court. The subsection employed the term 'conduct' and not 
'crime or offence.' This presumably entails that if a person, for example, is acquitted by the 
233 See Schabas, op .cit. note 28, at p. 70. 
234 Tallgren, op. cit. note 97, at p. 426, para. 12. 
235 Article 81(1) ofthe Rome Statute. 
236 For further discussion see Triffierer (ed), Commentary on the Rome Statute ... , op. cit. note 43. 
237 Article 83(2) of the Rome Statute. 
238 Article 84(1) ofthe Rome Statute. 
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Court for an allegation of genocide on the basis of a specific conduct, such person cannot be 
prosecuted again by the ICC for any other crime within the jurisdiction of the Court based on 
the same conduct. An issue raised in this regard is that article 5 crimes are said to be 'partly 
overlapping. ' 239 The Prosecutor must thus, do his best in prosecuting a perpetrator for the first 
time in relation to a particular conduct as any subsequent case against the same on the basis of 
the same conduct will be held inadmissible. 
B. Article 20(3) 
Article 20(3) concerns cases that had already been decided by a domestic court. It provides 
that the ICC cannot prosecute a person previously tried by a competent national court unless 
certain conditions are established, rendering the ne his in idem principle inapplicable. The 
conditions provided to which a case will be exempted from the double jeopardy rule mirror 
those of the unwillingness criterion under article 17(2). Article 20(3)(a) allows re-prosecution 
of an individual already tried under a domestic forum if the proceedings undertaken were 
found to be 'for the purposes of shielding the person concerned from criminal responsibility.' 
Article 20(3)(b) stipulates the ground where the proceedings lack impartiality or 
independence and 'were conducted in a manner which, in the circumstances, was inconsistent 
with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice.' It must further be noted that the ICC, 
strictly speaking, cannot carry out a retrial of an individual already tried by a State on any 
other ground apart from those provided under article 20(2). It cannot embark on a subsequent 
trial based on an error of fact, law or a procedural error, unless of course if an inference from 
such mistake can be made which points to unwillingness of a State to prosecute genuinely. As 
emphasised in the above discussions, the ICC was not established to act as an appellant court 
for domestic courts. 
Article 20(3) entails that a mere judgment of a domestic forum will not satisfy the 
complementarity requirement of the ICC. Its apparent violation of the ne his in idem principle 
was justified to cover cases where a State aims to shield a person from criminal responsibility 
239 See Tallgren, op. cit. note 97, at p. 426, para. 13. 
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through handing over a biased judgment, either via an acquittal or giving a sentence that is 
remarkably disproportionate to the crime committed. Article 20(3) is necessary to cure 
situations where a rogue State cleverly employs the application of the double jeopardy rule to 
bar the ICC from correcting an act of impunity. The credo was thought to be: 'if criminal 
justice is said to be done, it is to be done properly. ' 240 The said subsection can further be 
justified based on the argument that it does not violate the ne bis in idem principle as the 
domestic trials it is concerned with are not genuine proceedings. 
Some of the indicia relating to article 17(2)(a) and (c) are also applicable to satisfying the 
conditions of article 20(3). The latter article has to be distinguished as it concerns cases that 
had been adjudicated already by a domestic court. The relevant indicia would relate to how a 
national proceeding had been undertaken, as oppose to how it is being carried out. Procedural 
irregularities and institutional deficiencies, for example, are probable indicia to which the ICC 
may infer article 20(3) unwillingness, lack of impartiality or independence. It is submitted 
that the Court may also be able to infer unwillingness or lack of impartiality or independence 
in cases where a State had handed a sentence that was significantly disproportionate to the 
seriousness of the crime a person's conviction was based. 
Pertaining to a State's substantive rules on defences, could the Prosecutor satisfy the ne his in 
idem exemptions under article 20(3) on the basis that a defendant had avoided a domestic 
court conviction by successfully invoking a defence that would otherwise be unavailable 
under the Rome Statute'f41 On the one hand, a State could argue that allowing a retrial of a 
case based on such ground could undermine a State's sovereign right to discern which 
defences should be available under its national criminal law, assuming those defences do not 
run against international law norms and principles. On the other hand, abusing an 
unreasonably lenient criminal law may result to impunity and that the Rome Statute had not 
specifically put a limit as to which basis can the Prosecutor establish unwillingness under the 
ne bis in idem article. Although there is no impediment for the Prosecutor to claim 
admissibility based on the said ground, it must be emphasised that the critical factor is the 
240 Ibid., at para. 19. 
241 See discussion above where it was argued that defences that were not contemplated under the Rome Statute 
could result to de facto impunity from the perspective of the ICC, at p. 30-1, and Broomhall, International 
Justice, op. cit., note 88, at p. 92. 
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genuineness of the manner a trial was carried out. Prima facie, an acquittal or a conviction 
with a light sentence because of a successful summon of a defence, even if not contemplated 
under the Rome Statute, will suffice to meet the complementarity requirement of the Court 
and thus it would be inadmissible. 
A potential scenario concerning the ne bis in idem principle and domestic trials is where the 
ICC Prosecutor would suspect that a judgment was not genuine on the basis that a national 
court had acquitted a defendant, despite the existence of overwhelmingly incriminating 
evidence in favour of a conviction. This may be problematic for several reasons. According to 
the Informal Expert Paper, a determination of unwillingness must not be based on the 
substantive outcome of a decision, as for example, an acquittal of an obviously guilty person, 
but rather on the 'procedural' and 'institutional' factors.242 In principle, the ICC in 
determining unwillingness has no authority to evaluate the value of incriminating evidence 
against a person already tried by a competent domestic court. It can only base its admissibility 
determination on the manner a proceeding had been carried out. Allowing an ICC 
intervention, furthermore, on the basis that a domestic forum had unreasonably acquitted an 
accused- in the face of credible evidence incriminating that person- may run against the 
right of an accused to a presumption of innocence. If a retrial of a case based on such ground 
was allowed, the Court would be seen as having a prior opinion as to the guilt of the accused 
concerned even before the commencement of the ICC trial. In practice, however, it does not 
seem far from happening that the attention of the Prosecution will be drawn by victims or by 
NGOs to national decisions which blatantly contradict overwhelming evidence. Although it 
may not be permissible as evidence before an ICC admissibility determination, an acquittal 
that is truly unreasonable and virtually inconsistent to the available incriminating evidence 
would likely alarm the Prosecutor that such a judgment might not be genuine. 
The power of the ICC under article 20(3) to re-prosecute an individual has no temporal 
restraint as to when the Court can exercise it. The relevant subsection had not provided any 
time limit. In other words, the ICC could thus, unsettle a final judgment by a domestic court 
any time from when a decision had been delivered until, in principle, countless years ahead. 
As pointed out by Olasolo, the absence of a time frame has an effect on the res judicata of 
242 Informal Expert Paper, op. cit. note 38, para 46. 
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domestic judgment vis-a-vis the ICC and article 20(3).243 From the perspective of States, it 
becomes uncertain as to when can a judgment become final in relation to the ICC. Although it 
can be said that bona fide efforts would bar the Court from intervening and would therefore, 
conclude res judicata of domestic decisions, the ultimate determination as to its fmality rests 
upon the ICC. From the point of view of the ICC, nonetheless, the admissibility of a case is 
subject to strict conditions of establishing either an intention to shield a perpetrator or a lack 
of impartiality or independence that is contrary to an intent to carry out genuine proceedings; 
these conditions, given their high thresholds, are not that easy to satisfy and would most likely 
involve onerous evidentiary burden. 
A further point in relation to article 20(3) that is worthy of a brief discussion is where a 
person was tried for an ordinary crime on the basis of a conduct that constitutes an 
international crime. As discussed above, the ICC is precluded from re-prosecuting a case 
based on conducts that was also the basis upon which a domestic court acquitted or convicted 
a defendant. The use of the term 'conduct' under article 20(3), as opposed to a 'crime' in 
article 20(2), which bar domestic courts from carrying out a retrial of cases that have been 
already decided by the ICC, suggests that the effect of the double of jeopardy rule was 
intended to have a broad scope. 244 Nevertheless, what if a prosecution of a person for ordinary 
crime based on conducts that constitute an exceptionally serious international crime trivialises 
the conduct committed, to the point in which it can be claimed that justice had not been 
served and impunity had been actualised? Unless under prosecution could be inferred as an 
underhanded way of shielding an offender from criminal accountability, it seems unlikely that 
the ICC would be able to commence a retrial under such circumstances. It could be added, 
however, that those conducts prescribed under the Rome Statute would constitute serious 
offences, even if in a given instance, the same were legally characterised as an ordinary crime 
and not as an international crime. For example, a conduct nationally characterised as a 
murder, instead of genocide, would yet sanction severe punishment under any domestic 
criminal law. Likewise, rape or torture even if not classified to be part of a criminal enterprise 
of crimes against humanity, would expectedly result to serious sentences if found to have 
been committed. Moreover, the practical aspect that the Court's financial resources are 
243 Olasolo, op. cit., note 14, at p. 153. 
244 See discussion in Schabas, op. cit. note 28, at p. 70 
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limited could mean that the Prosecutor and the ICC will prioritize and put their attention to 
more egregious situations elsewhere rather than contemplate upon a retrial of a case which 
was already decided domestically and likewise, protecting an accused, or a lack of 
impartiality or independence of the State concerned cannot be easily established. 
V. UN SECURITY COUNCIL REFERRALS 
Under article 13 of the Rome Statute, the UN Security Council, usmg its Chapter VII 
mandate, is given the power to refer situations to the Prosecutor?45 It is only logical that the 
main body responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security is conferred 
with the authority to refer situations to an institution that is mandated to adjudicate cases that 
are of international concern. In practical terms, article 13 also relieves the Council from 
political pressures to create ad hoc tribunals in response to every case of serious human rights 
and humanitarian law violations that would occur. The Court could thus, serve as a standing 
permanent judicial body that the Security Council may revert to, when maintaining 
international peace and security, renders prosecution of perpetrators to be necessary. 
Where the Council is to refer a situation in which article 5 crimes appear to have been 
committed in the territory of a non-State party of the ICC or the alleged perpetrator is a 
citizen of a non-State party, such referral has the effect of extending the Court's jurisdiction 
beyond its member States' territories and nationals.246 The binding authority of Chapter VII 
245 The Security Council only has power to refer 'situations' and not specific 'crimes.' See Philips, op. cit. note 
48, at p. 72: 'The distinction between State and Security Council referral of "situations" and Prosecutor-initiated 
investigations into "crimes" is important, and reflects attempts to de-politicize the Court by withholding State £arty and Security Council authority to haul individuals before it ... ' 
46 The temporal scope of the Court's jurisdiction could also be extended (but not retrospectively prior to 1"1 of 
July 2003) where the situation the Security Council had referred occurred during the enforcement period of the 
Rome Statute to which the Statute was not in force yet in the national jurisdiction concerned. 
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Resolutions, to which Council referrals must take form,247 binds all UN member States, and in 
effect, allows for such provisional expansion of the jurisdiction of the ICC. This had been the 
case in the Security Council referral to the Prosecutor of the situation in Darfur. Sudan is not 
an ICC member State and the suspected perpetrators are Sudanese nationals. The Prosecutor, 
nevertheless, initiated an investigation, satisfied that the ICC has jurisdiction over the matter 
and that the situation was, indeed, admissible before the Court. 
In view of the significant power of a Security Council Resolution to extend the Court's 
ratione loci and personae, a relevant question revolves around the possibility that a Council 
referral would effectively exempt a situation from the complementarity requirement of the 
Rome Statute. 248 In other words, does inaction, unwillingness or inability under the terms of 
article 17 have to be established even in Security Council referrals or could a Council 
Resolution extend its authority so as to leave no discretion to the ICC but to hold its referrals 
admissible? An analysis of the relevant provisions of the Rome Statute would lead one to the 
conclusion that any case or situation, even those referred to by the Security Council, will have 
to satisfy the prerequisites of the complementarity jurisdiction of the Court. 249 
First, there is nothing in the Rome Statute which stipulates that a Council referral is 
automatically admissible before the ICC. In particular, no exemption from the 
complementarity requirement is specified under article 17. Second, the wording of article 53, 
which stipulates how the Prosecutor is to treat referrals by States or the Security Council, 
confers no special treatment favouring Council referrals. Regardless of whether a referral was 
received from a State party or from the Council or where the Prosecutor considers using its 
proprio motu power, article 53(1) applies and directs the Prosecutor to determine whether or 
not to initiate an investigation and ascertain, inter alia, if the situation or the case 'is or would 
be admissible under article 17.' Security Council referrals, in principle, do not entail that the 
Prosecutor will be under the obligation to prosecute or even initiate any formal investigation. 
In the event where the Prosecutor decides not to lodge an investigation, article 53(3) 
241 Article 13(b ). 
248 This question had been left unresolved during the Rome conference. Discussion concerning the relationship 
of the ICC with the Security Council was dominated by the Council's ability to inactivate the Court's 
jurisdiction under article 1 6. 
249 In the Informal Expert Paper, op. cit. note 38, at p. 21, the experts concluded: 'As a matter of principle, the 
complementarity regime applies even in the event of a Security Council referral.' 
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contemplates that the Council could only request the Pre-Trial Chamber to review the 
Prosecutor's decision not to proceed and ask the Prosecutor to 'reconsider that decision.' 
Furthermore, it can be said that the Rome Statute would have explicitly provided for it, if 
Council referrals are, indeed, exempted from the complementarity requirement of the ICC?50 
In contrast, however, article 18(1 ), which reqmres the Prosecutor, upon deciding to 
commence an initial investigation, to notify all States parties or those that may exercise 
jurisdiction, specifies that no notification requirement is mandatory for Security Council 
referrals. The purpose of the notification requisite under article 18 is significant to the 
complementarity regime in ensuring that no State is investigating or prosecuting genuinely, 
but the omission of the required notification for Council referrals does not entail exemption 
from the complementarity conditions of the Court's exercise of jurisdiction.251 Whilst it 
alleviates one of the statutory requirements to which the Prosecutor must fulfil so as to bring a 
case before the Court, it is submitted that the essential complementarity precondition of article 
17, i.e. a fmding of inaction, unwillingness or inability, still applies.252 
On a much broader perspective, mention must be made as regards the expansive discretionary 
power of the Security Council. The Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter is given a 
wide discretion to issue measures with the view of maintaining international peace and 
security. From economic sanctions to establishing ad hoc tribunals, the Security Council had 
made Chapter VII Resolutions which legally bind all UN member States. Significantly 
however, Council Resolutions do not bind independent international institutions, including 
the ICC and its Prosecutor. It is submitted, not only would the Security Council be unable to 
modify the provisions of the Rome Statute even through the issuance of Resolution but 
accordingly, its broad powers cannot exempt its referrals from sieving through the Court on a 
250 Ibid 
251 See Fletcher & Ohlin, The ICC- Two Courts in One? [2006] 4 nCJ 428, at p. 431-3. The absence of the 
notification requirement under article 18 may suggests that States cannot challenge the admissibility of a 
situation on complementarity grounds, but it is not clear whether it is the same if such State is to challenge under 
article 19. Whether or not challenging admissibility under article 19 is viable, it seems at the very least one may 
conclude that the Office of the Prosecutor must satisfY itself that a situation referred to by the Security Council 
aEpears to be admissible under the terms of article 17. 
2 2 See ibid. 
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'complementarity footing.' 253 Apart from the notification requirement under article 18, the 
normal complementarity conditions of the Rome Statute will apply.254 
The point that the Security Council cannot, in principle, legally enforce automatic 
admissibility of its referrals is important as it upholds the Prosecutor's independence as well 
as the over-all integrity of the ICC. However, relevant practical and political factors have to 
be considered in contemplating about the admissibility of Council referrals in practice. 
Firstly, the value and significance of a Security Council Resolution must not be 
underestimated. With the veto power of the permanent five members of Security Council, 
adopting a binding Resolution normally involves a politically difficult and complicated 
process. A situation that triggered an adoption of a Council Resolution presumably entails 
that such a situation constitutes a threat to international peace and security and therefore, 
poses an alanning concern to the international community. By virtue of the fact that Council 
referrals come in the form of Chapter VII Resolutions, the Prosecutor cannot easily disregard 
them. It may be argued further, that the Security Council would not adopt a Resolution 
referring a situation, without any accompanying deliberation as regards to the 
complementarity principle and article 17 issues of admissibility under the Rome Statue. In the 
case of Darfur, for instance, the Security Council made a referral to the Prosecutor in 
accordance with the recommendation of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, 
which claimed that the State authority concerned, lacked both willingness and ability to carry 
out genuine proceedings. 255 As such, the Darfur case strongly suggests that it is not totally 
unreasonable to maintain that the Prosecutor, in practice, will at the very least, initiate a 
formal investigation, in response to Security Council referrals. 
Secondly, the recurrent theme of the Court's limited financial and human resources is also 
relevant in relation to referrals by the Council. Contrary to what had just been mentioned, 
where the Council uses its article 13 authority to refer situations much too frequently, the 
Prosecutor, citing logistical constraints, could not be expected to initiate formal investigation 
in every Security Council referral. Moreover, the question was raised pertaining to funding as 
253 See Philips, op. cit. note 48, at p. 73. 
2~4 For further discussion see Sarooshi, 'The Peace and Justice Paradox: The International Criminal Court and 
the UN Security Council' in The Permanent International Criminal Court, op. cit. note 2, at p. 96-102. 
255 Op. cit. note 166. 
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regards referrals made by the Security Council. As the Court could serve as a standing judicial 
body for the Security Council, an alternative to creating an ad hoc tribunal which proved to be 
too expensive to maintain, it seems logical that a question can be raised concerning the 
Court's facilities being 'offered to the United Nations free of charge'; the ICC not being an 
organ of the UN, in the first place.256 
Thirdly, it was maintained by Sarroshi that the Rome Statute 'has raised the stakes by 
requiring a Chapter VII decision and thus, arguably, raised the expectation of Security 
Council Members [and possibly the international community] that effective action in the form 
of a prosecution or at the very least, an investigation will follow. ' 257 How prepared would the 
Security Council be to accept a decision by the Prosecutor not to investigate or the Court not 
proceed with a trial? In this regard, it can be added that the ICC and the Prosecutor, having no 
enforcement body, need to keep a good relationship with the Security Council. In 
implementing its orders over rogue States, the ICC would likely need the power of the 
Council as a supra ordinate body to form forces necessary to enforce such orders. 258 Decisions 
by the Prosecutor or the Court not to proceed with an investigation or a trial in response to 
Council referrals would unlikely help build a sound relationship between the Court and the 
Security Council. It must be noted, nevertheless, this third factor shall not be pertinent, at 
least in theory, to the Prosecutor or the ICC in determining the admissibility of Council 
referrals. 
Whilst as a matter of principle, Security Council referrals are not automatically admissible 
before the ICC, the Informal Expert Paper discussed the possibility of the Council, through 
adopting a Chapter VII resolution, to 'order all or some UN member States to yield to the 
Court, by declining to exercise their primary jurisdiction with respect to crimes investigated 
256 Schabas, op. cit. note 28, at p. I 00. 
m Ibid 
258 Current example of non-cooperative States is the situation concerning Sudan. In a public oath on 4 April 
2005, the president of Sudan, Omar al-Bashir, swore 'thrice in the name of God that I shall never hand any 
Sudanese national to a foreign court.' Hoge, International War-Crimes Prosecutor Gets Lists of 51 Sudan 
Suspects, New York Times, 6 April 2005 (available at 
<http://www. genocidewatch. org/sudanintemationalwarcrimesprosecutergetslistofsuspects6apri12005 .htm> ). It is 
interesting to ask how the ICC would deal with uncooperative attitude of national governments. See also 
Kaufman, Justice in Jeopardy: Accountability for the DarfUr Atrocities [2005] 16 Crim. L. Forum 343, at p. 349-
54, and Arsanjani & Reismann, op. cit. note 56, at p. 399-40 I. 
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and prosecuted by the ICC. ' 259 It was emphasised in the Informal Paper that the 
complementarity principle would still be applicable despite such a resolution but 
'admissibility would be upheld by the Court, given the resulting absence of competing 
national proceeding as a result of compliance' with the resolution.260 In other words, the 
relevant situation would be admissible on the grounds of inaction, provided that the relevant 
States complied with the Council order and that the situation satisfies the gravity threshold of 
article 17(l)(c). Given the argument that the Security Council has wide powers, on the one 
hand, it was pointed out, on the other hand, that ordering inaction on States over crimes of 
genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes may be regarded as a blatant violation of 
the principles of jus cohens under which States have the obligation to repress serious 
international crimes. The authors of the Informal Paper were divided as regards to the 
possibility of the Security Council adopting such a resolution towards a view of expediting 
the admissibility of a situation to the ICC. If for argument's sake, it can be presumed that the 
Council could make such an order, it must nevertheless be underscored that the Prosecutor 
and the ICC would maintain their independence as to whether a formal investigation can be 
initiated or a case issuing from a referral by the Security Council will be admitted.261 
259 Informal Expert Paper, op. cit. note 38, at p. 22. 
260 Ibid 
261 Ibid 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The Court's jurisdiction, based on the principle of complementarity, is only to supplement 
national courts when they are unwilling or unable to carry out proceedings genuinely. The 
complementarity principle is intended to preserve States' sovereign rights. As pronounced in 
the Rome Statute Preamble, the said principle recognises the duty of States to investigate and 
prosecute serious international crimes. The concept behind the complementarity principle is 
unequivocally clear, but its substantial application in practice remains to be seen. In looking at 
how article 17, which realises the complementarity principle, may be interpreted in practice, it 
seems that the relevant provision had left the ICC judges a significant task of interpreting the 
admissibility of cases. It can be argued, on the one hand, that the ICC judges are rightly left 
with a wide discretionary scope in construing article 17, so as not to constraint rigidly the 
admissibility of cases. On the other hand, a wide room for interpreting admissibility may be 
viewed as incompatible with the framers' intent and with what States had consented to when 
they signed and ratified the Rome Statute. 
In the Court's first admissibility determination, the case involving Mr Lubanga, the Pre-Trial 
Chamber decided that the case was admissible on the basis of inaction. However, such ground 
for admissibility was not expressly mentioned anywhere in the Rome Statute. The Chamber 
was left to construe the inherent admissibility of inaction from the negative wording of 
article17(1), i.e. a case is inadmissible where it falls under article 17(l)(a), (b) or (c). In other 
words, as a case of inaction, in its very definition, would not be one that is being investigated 
or prosecuted, or had been investigated or prosecuted by a State, it will therefore be 
automatically admissible. 
The criterion unwillingness, which is defmed under article 17(2), also leaves the Court with 
much room for interpretation. For example, evidence that the Prosecutor can put forth to 
establish an intent from a State to shield an accused from criminal conviction are varied and 
wide. As regards the inability criterion, this may appear more rigid than unwillingness. 
Satisfying the inability criterion requires proving a failure to obtain evidence or arrest an 
accused on the part of the State concerned, due to a total or substantial collapsed or 
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unavailability of its legal system. Whilst there is no question regarding 'total or substantial 
collapsed', the significance and how far can the latter term 'unavailability' be interpreted are 
uncertain. 
Concerning Security Council referrals, they can have the effect of expanding the Court's 
territorial jurisdiction to non-States parties. Indeed, the Security Council is bestowed with a 
vast power to pass resolutions which bind all UN members. Nevertheless, its authority is 
constrained within the UN Charter?62 The Security Council is incapable of exempting its 
referrals from the complementarity requirement. There is also a firm case to argue that it 
cannot oblige States, through adopting a resolution, to remain inactive in order to defer 
jurisdiction to the Court, in relation to serious crimes which States have an international duty 
to investigate and prosecute. A hypothetical Council resolution requiring States not to 
investigate international crimes may run in conflict with international law and is therefore 
likely to be regarded as unsound. Furthermore, it is important that the ICC and the Prosecutor 
remains, in principle, independent from the Security Council because of their functions in 
dispensing justice. Nonetheless, it is to be emphasised that the ICC, which have no 
enforcement facilities to implement its rulings, would need the support of the Security 
Council in certain cases, e.g. where a State refuses to cooperate with the Court. It is thus, not 
an ideal setting that ICC is totally distanced from the Security Council. 
262 Article 24 of the UN Charter. 
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